1987, Air Afrique and the French-owned Air Transport Union (Union des Transports Aériens—UTA). These carriers shared four flights weekly through Chad's only international airport, at N'Djamena, with connections to Paris twice weekly and also south to Bangui and Brazzaville twice weekly. N'Djamena's airport was capable of receiving the largest aircraft, including Boeing 747 and Airbus passenger airplanes used by the two carriers, and giant cargo aircraft such as the C-5A used in military supply. The airport was rehabilitated after armed hostilities in 1980 and 1981 destroyed all control and support facilities. Rehabilitation included widening and extending the runway. Other smaller regional carriers handled traffic to Khartoum (Air Sudan) and to Douala (Cameroon Airlines). Chad's own airline, Air Tchad, served internal routes to Abéché, Sarh, and Moundou and to other points on an occasional basis. In 1987 Air Tchad was equipped with a nineteen-seat Twin Otter and a forty-four-seat Fokker 27. Internal traffic also was served by several small four- to six-passenger aircraft owned privately or by international organizations. In addition to the airport at N'Djamena, smaller fields at Abéché, Sarh, and Moundou were capable of receiving small jet traffic and propeller aircraft. Small dirt strips were also located in several towns throughout the country.

Communications

Chad's telecommunications system was one of the least developed in Africa. International telecommunications were conducted by the parastatal International Telecommunications Company of Chad (Société de Télécommunications Internationales du Tchad—STIT) under the responsibility of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Telephone and telex service between Paris and N'Djamena assured communications with the international community. No direct links, however, existed in 1986 between Chad and its African neighbors; all telecommunications passed via Paris. Some internal telephone service connected Abéché, Moundou, Sarh, and N'Djamena. The only means of internal communications was by shortwave radio. Postal service via air between Paris and N'Djamena existed. However, postal service beyond the capital, except to Moundou and Sarh, was limited. In 1987 international mail had to be delivered to the central post office in the capital a day before the next scheduled flight to Paris to assure delivery. Mail arriving in N'Djamena was posted to boxes at the central post office for pickup by box owners. No delivery was available to residences or businesses, all official addresses in the capital being post office boxes.

Trade and Commerce

Historically, Chad has been a country of traders. The ancient kingdoms of Kanem, Borno, and Wadai built their power on trade with Libya, Egypt, and Sudan (see Era of Empires: A.D. 900–1900, ch. 1). During the colonial period, trade increased with francophone countries and Nigeria. In the 1970s, the structure and direction of external trade remained similar to the pattern of colonial times, the most important trading partners being France and Nigeria. Exports to France were principally cotton fiber, and imports were finished manufactured goods and equipment. Much of the trade with Nigeria, consisting of cattle, fish, natron, and other traditional products, was unrecorded and did not pass through official channels. Since the civil upheavals of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which restricted all external trade, unofficial trade with Nigeria has resumed. Official trade with France declined after 1982, primarily because many French-affiliated firms closed during the conflicts. As of late 1987, many of those concerns had not reopened.

Controlling smuggling and black market activity was very difficult. Chad and its neighbors had few resources that could be devoted to border control. Collusion among smugglers and border patrols and customs agents was common. Moreover, Chad's unofficial trade with Nigeria, Cameroon, and Central African Republic has historical and social roots. Tribal and extended family connections across borders encouraged traders to maintain long-range commercial and financial networks beyond colonial and, later, national government control and taxes. Traders unofficially exported the bulk of Chad's exports of cattle, fish, and other traditional products. Unofficial imports consisted of petroleum products and consumer goods, such as sugar, cooking oil, soap, and cigarettes, that competed with production by national industries. The permeability of Chad's borders and the informality of traditional trading networks denied the government revenues ordinarily derived from export-import duties. Locally produced goods and legal imports fared badly in this market, burdened as they were with high production costs, lack of economies of scale, and price distortions imposed by government controls.

Exports

The bulk of Chad's official exports were agricultural products, which have accounted for 80 to 95 percent of all exports since independence. Of these exports, cotton fiber was most important, followed by cattle and beef exports. The value of Chad's cotton fiber exports rose steadily in the 1970s (see Cotton, this ch.). During

the early 1980s, as armed conflict took its toll on cotton production, the value of cotton fiber exports dropped. The return of political stability in 1983 and increased cotton production coincided with a rise in world cotton prices, resulting in dramatic increases in the value of Chad's cotton exports in 1983 and 1984. The value of these exports more than doubled from 1982 to 1983 and almost doubled again in 1984.

The downturn of world cotton prices in 1985 caused a collapse in cotton exports. The value of cotton fiber exports from Chad in 1985 was less than half that of the record 1984 level; the value fell even further in 1986. In 1984 cotton fiber had represented 73 percent of the value of all Chad's exports, but in 1986 it represented only 43 percent. The value of all exports also reflected the decline, falling from a high in 1984 of almost CFA F48 billion to around CFA F34 billion in 1986.

The estimated value of Chad's cattle exports remained more stable from 1983 to 1986. As the value of cotton fiber exports declined, the relative importance of cattle exports to the Chadian economy grew.

Imports

Since the late 1960s, the economic significance of imported manufactured and capital goods has grown considerably. From 1967 to 1970, manufactured goods of all types accounted for 46 to 50 percent of Chad's imports. By 1975 manufactured goods accounted for 65 percent of imports. The total value of all imports also grew, doubling between 1965 and 1970 to almost CFA F13 billion. Total imports continued to grow through 1978 to nearly CFA F36 billion before showing a serious decline from 1979 to 1981 because of the heavy fighting. Imports increased after 1982, reaching around CFA F37 billion in 1983 and then doubling by 1985. The leap in imports between these years reflected not only the increase in imported manufactured and capital goods needed to rebuild the shattered economic infrastructure but also an increase in food assistance in these years of drought. The downturn of imports between 1985 and 1986 indicated in part a decline in food imports with the return of good rains.

Direction of Trade

Throughout the 1960s—Chad's first decade of independence—France remained its most important official trading partner. In 1970 France absorbed 73 percent of Chad's exports and provided some 40 percent of Chad's imports. Between 1979 and 1985, Chad diversified its markets by trading more actively with Spain, the Federal

Republic of Germany (West Germany), and particularly Portugal, which absorbed the bulk of Chad's exports, mainly cotton fiber. By 1985 France ranked sixth behind Portugal, West Germany, Cameroon, Spain and the Benelux countries (Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg; see table 5, Appendix A). Chad's exports of beef and other traditional products to its neighbors, and especially to Nigeria, did not appear in official trade figures.

Although losing significance as a customer, France remained Chad's most important supplier. In 1985 France supplied almost one-fourth of Chad's total imports. The United States ranked second, followed by Cameroon, Italy, and the Benelux countries; unspecified West European countries accounted for about 21 percent of Chad's imports in 1985. Chad had little trade with Middle Eastern and North African countries. Both official and black market oil imports came from either Cameroon or Nigeria. Chad had no declared trade with the Soviet Union or East European countries.

Balance of Payments and Finance

Balance of Payments

With the exception of the 1979–81 period, which were years of heavy conflict when collapsed imports were offset by some continued cotton exports, Chad has run deficits in its trade balance since the 1960s (see table 6, Appendix A). The size of these deficits depended on the world cotton market. In 1984, when Chad had high export earnings as a result of record cotton production and high world cotton prices, the trade deficit was modest. The following year, when world cotton prices fell, production declined. Export earnings from cotton were half those of 1984, and total export earnings on all goods dropped by one-third. Problems with the cotton sector continued in 1986 and 1987. World cotton prices remained low, and the fall in the value of the United States dollar aggravated the situation because world cotton prices were quoted in dollars. At the same time that export earnings dropped, Chad's imports rose. The value of imports increased by almost 40 percent in 1985. A large part of this rise resulted from oil exploration, which was only partially offset by direct investments in Chad by the oil drilling companies. Increased imports of fertilizers and insecticides for Cotontchad's expanded program to improve production in those years also contributed to the trade deficit. The net result of these events was that the modest trade deficits of 1983 and 1984 grew into large deficits in 1985 and 1986.



A ferry over the Chari River
Courtesy Audrey Kizziar
Trucks carrying medical supplies over dirt tracks in the sahelian *zone*
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee)

Banking and Finance

Chad has been a member of the BEAC since independence. The BEAC, with the backing of the French treasury, served as the central bank of its member states: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Consequently, Chad has adhered to the Franc Zone, using as currency the African Financial Community franc, (Communauté Financière Africaine—CFA; for value of the CFA franc—see Glossary). Use of the CFA franc, which was tied to the value of the French franc (FF) at CFA F50 to FF1, gave Chad a stable, convertible currency. This factor spurred trader confidence in the value of the currency and in the ability to convert to hard currency acceptable as payment for imports. It was particularly helpful to the economy to have a stable currency backed by regional and international cooperation and not subject to political whim as governments and coalitions fought for power in Chad. Reconstruction after 1982 would have been far slower and more difficult had currency value suffered the volatility, inflation, and distrust of traders so often encountered in other Third World nations.

All banking offices closed in 1979 and 1980 when N'Djamena was the scene of heavy fighting. The BEAC reopened in 1981 along with the BIAT, the BTCD, and the Development Bank of Chad (Banque de Développement du Tchad—BDT). Only the International Bank for Commerce and Industry in Chad (Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie du Tchad—BICIT) had failed to reopen by late 1987, leaving Chad with only three banks plus the central bank. Of the three banks, only the BIAT—the local subsidiary of the French-owned International Bank for West Africa (Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale—BIAO) was totally under private ownership. The government and the French bank Crédit Lyonnais shared joint ownership of the BTCD, along with some other smaller investors. The BDT was the principal government-controlled bank for development purposes; it received considerable support from the CCCE, a key arm of French foreign assistance programs.

In Chad the flow of credit and cash traditionally followed the rhythm of the cotton-growing season. Cotontchad, by law required to buy all cotton produced at preset prices, made short-term loans from the banks before planting each year to import materials for its cultivation improvement programs and to pay the producers for their crops at harvest. The credit portfolios of Chad's banks reflected this situation. In 1986 almost 90 percent of the claims on banks were short-term loans, more than 70 percent of which were

consigned to Cotontchad. Overall, Cotontchad claimed 64 percent of all credit available to the economy. In 1984, with rising cotton production and good world prices, credit extended by the BEAC expanded quickly. This credit permitted an adequate level of industrial and consumer imports but drained the BEAC's exchange reserves. With the collapse of world cotton prices in 1985, Cotontchad's revenues dropped, and foreign exchange flowing into Chad declined. As a result, the BEAC's exchange reserves dropped precipitously in 1986. Operations in the banking sector ground to a halt as Cotontchad fell into arrears on repayments of its short-term debt. In late 1986, the BEAC negotiated a rescheduling of about three-fourths of the short-term debt, allowing a ten-year maturity, including a five-year grace period with an interest rate of 6 percent. The solution neither reduced the exposure of the private banks for loans to Cotontchad nor directly improved the general credit situation for other potential borrowers, especially the small- and medium-sized enterprises that often were squeezed out of the market. It did, however, save Chad's banking structure and Cotontchad from immediate collapse by buying time for longer-term solutions to be formulated with the aid of foreign donors.

No mechanisms existed for extending credit directly to farmers beyond assistance for cotton production. Before the Chadian Civil War, the BDT and the ONDR extended credit on a limited basis, as did the government's Rural Action and Development Fund (Fonds de Développement et d'Action Rurale—FDAR). But these credits for marketing agricultural products were not repaid, and the FDAR ceased operations in 1981. In 1985 the government created the Fund for Rural Intervention (Fonds d'Intervention Rurale—FIR) to replace the FDAR. Through 1987 the government was unable to fund the FIR, and the international donor community did not provide agricultural credit on a sectoral level other than for cotton, which impeded Chad's intention to diversify its agricultural economy. In 1986 the World Bank financed a study and a long-term technical assistance program to determine credit needs and options for the design of an appropriate system of rural credits. These actions were taken in cooperation with other institutions, such as the ONDR (extension services) and SIMAT under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

In 1983 the government imposed a five-year moratorium that froze all deposits and outstanding credits before 1980. The moratorium's purpose was to prevent a run on banks and to staunch capital flight when banks restored operations in early 1983 under the new government. The impact of the moratorium was twofold. On

the one hand, it served to reduce credit available to the economy because entrepreneurs were unable to withdraw assets for investment or operations. On the other hand, the amount of frozen credits was more than double that of frozen deposits, so the action protected other businesses from service on debts during the hard times of recovery.

The longer-term financial situation was bleak. The problem of interest payments to the BEAC for rediscounted credits, which made up the majority of frozen credits, compounded by Cotontchad's difficulties in meeting its debt obligations to the banks, seriously strained Chad's banking system.

Government Finances

In 1983 the Ministry of Finance produced its first central government budget in four years. By 1986 the government had adopted a standardized nomenclature that resulted in more effective management of revenues and expenditures throughout government ministries. The government also initiated measures to improve tax administration, including the reorganization of customs inspections in the capital, the creation of tax enforcement teams and tax offices in secondary cities, and greater control over records for the largest tax-paying enterprises. The State Control (Contrôle d'Etat), an autonomous auditing unit directly attached to the presidency, performed audits and investigations throughout public agencies and enterprises to deter fraud and misuse of public funds.

Chad's public sector was small compared with the size of the economy. In 1977 total government revenues amounted to about 9 percent of GDP. The deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP, although low when compared with such figures for other nations, was nevertheless significant because the figure represented one-third of total government revenues in that year. In absolute terms, revenues and expenditures were small but increasing from 1983 through 1985. The small size of government was a consequence of its reestablishment after the conflicts ended in 1982 and the limited resources of administration. The government's preference for a liberal economy, with the public sector a complement to, and not a substitute for, the private sector, also helped to hold down the size of the central administration. The sharp increases in expenditures and revenues from 1983 to 1985 reflect the reinstitution of government operations after 1982 and the increases in cotton-generated revenues during these years of good crops and high world cotton prices. The equally sharp decline in revenues in 1986 reflected the drop in world cotton prices and the halt in Cotontchad's contributions to the central treasury through duties on cotton

exports. In the mid-1980s, expenditures, elevated by defense spending and the needs of a stable administration, first stagnated and then dropped somewhat. The reduction, however, did not keep pace with declining revenues, resulting in a 90 percent increase in the deficit in 1986.

During the same year, under terms of the Emergency Cotton Program, Cotontchad ceased all fiscal contributions to the government. The government's challenge was to control the fiscal deficit in the absence of cotton revenues either by cutting expenditures or by generating additional revenues. There was little room for movement on the expenditure side. Military outlays and salaries of government employees were the largest budget items. Defense spending was highly unpredictable and unlikely to be reduced quickly in the face of continued insurgency in the north. The officially declared defense expenditures were between 34.5 and 37.6 percent of government spending from 1984 to 1986 (see Defense Expenditures, ch. 5). Clearly, however, such figures represented only a part of total military spending, which may have been as high as 70 percent of government expenditures.

Government salaries were also difficult to reduce. The reinstitution of administrative government activities in 1982 brought the number of civil servants to between 20,000 and 23,000 by 1985. This increase reflected not only the government's renewal of operations but also its policy of national reconciliation. In part, that policy guaranteed positions to the most important former civil servants—largely those from the southern regions—who wanted to reenter government service. In the 1985–86 period, the government paid civil servants only 60 percent of their salaries, based on salary scales set in 1967. Although salaries for civil servants were low, the government was often unable to finance the whole wage bill without external budget support, and it often delayed payments until disbursements were covered by international donors.

Expenditures on government goods and services were low, as evidenced by the general scarcity of basic equipment and supplies in government offices. Civil servants often functioned without desks, chairs, paper, and such office equipment as typewriters and copying machines. Moreover, cutting expenditures for parastatals achieved no savings because the government did not subsidize their operations directly. The parastatals relied on their own sources of local revenues or foreign donor support. Donors also financed public investment and a large part of recurrent costs associated with development projects.

The government's financial resources consisted of fiscal revenues, special funds, and exceptional taxes. The small size of Chad's

modern, monetary sector limited the tax base. With the fall of world cotton prices and reduced production and income both to Cotontchad and to peasant producers, the tax base shrank even more in 1985. In the mid-1980s, relatively few economic agents bore the tax load. Taxes were derived particularly from the five major industries—Cotontchad (exempted in 1986), the STT, the BdL, SONASUT, and the MCT. Their burden included (in order of importance) import-export duties, excise taxes, corporate taxes, and turnover taxes. In 1986 fiscal revenues amounted to 5 percent of GDP, compared with 9 percent in 1977 and 15 percent in the peak year of 1971. This percentage compared unfavorably with those in some other African states, such as Central African Republic (12 percent), Mauritania (22 percent), and Senegal (19.5 percent).

In 1984 the government first imposed exceptional taxes to finance national reconstruction. All salaried employees, whether in government or in the private sector, were taxed one month's salary. In 1985 the government repeated the effort to combat the effects of drought and in 1987 introduced a variable tax to support the war effort. Although these taxes placed a burden on taxpayers, the government did not account for these taxes in the official budget.

Several special funds either collected taxes on behalf of the government or derived revenues from their own activities. The two most important funds were the CSPC, and the Petroleum Products Fund (Fonds d'Intervention des Produits Pétroliers—FIPP). The CSPC's mandate included stabilizing producer prices for cotton furnished to Cotontchad, financing the deficit of Cotontchad, and playing a part in industrial and commercial operations of the cotton sector. The plan called for 80 percent of any Cotontchad surplus to go to the CSPC, with Cotontchad retaining the remainder. Any Cotontchad deficit was to be financed by the CSPC. From 1972 through 1984, Cotontchad transferred about CFA F21 billion to the CSPC. The CSPC, however, did not finance Cotontchad's deficits, which were particularly acute after 1985. Rather, the CSPC used its resources to subsidize the ONDR and the IRCT to invest in other public enterprises and to finance its own administrative costs. Since 1986, under the Emergency Cotton Program, Cotontchad ceased contributions to the CSPC, which no longer played its mandated role. FIPP was set up to equalize petroleum import prices from Nigerian and Cameroonian sources, so that Chad would not become overly dependent on either source for its fuel supplies. FIPP was to tax cheaper Nigerian imports, thereby subsidizing Cameroonian imports, breaking even in the process. But the system never worked properly and ultimately led to considerable fraud, with cheaper Nigerian imports often receiving subsidies after leaving

Cameroon. Poor border control also contributed to FIPP's inability to stabilize and equalize imports and prices on petroleum. In 1987 the government, along with the donor community, were reviewing the roles of these two institutions.

The National Debt and Foreign Assistance

National Debt

The CAA was responsible for servicing Chad's external public debt. The CAA collected revenues not included in the government budget to service the debt. Those revenues consisted mostly of unit taxes on manufactured goods and taxes on the profits of industry, banks, and the surpluses of other special funds. In 1985 and 1986, losses of revenues from the cotton sector also affected the CAA's revenues. In 1986 the CAA compensated by imposing new taxes on other industries, and it also strengthened its administration and collection abilities.

From 1980 to 1985, Chad's annual external debt averaged US$169 million (see table 7, Appendix A). In 1987 Chad's public and publicly guaranteed debt (outstanding and disbursed) stood at about US$206 million, amounting to 25 percent of GDP. Three-fourths of the debt was given on concessional terms; two-thirds of this amount was owed to multilateral creditors, and one-third was owed to bilateral donors. One-fourth of the debt represented non-concessional loans that predated the 1979–82 conflict and were owed to suppliers, private financial institutions, and certain bilateral creditors, such as Kuwait. Even before hostilities escalated in 1979, Chad's credit-worthiness was low and through 1987 was insufficient to tap private financial markets. Only official creditors lent to Chad. The volume of lending was low in the 1983–85 period, but in 1986 the World Bank resumed lending, and France increased its lending. In 1987 lending on concessional terms to Chad reached pre-1977 levels of about US$40 million a year. Chad's actual debt service ratio—as a proportion of export earnings on goods and services—was low in 1986, standing at 1.5 percent. When payments on arrears and the BEAC payments to the IMF (which were to be transferred to the CAA in 1988) were added, Chad's total debt service ratio stood at between 5 and 7 percent. Although considered low by most standards, this situation created a heavy burden for the CAA and the Chadian government. For the 1987–89 period, Chad faced scheduled debt service on existing loans of between US$10 and US$13 million per year, more than double the amount the government was able to pay in the 1985–87 period. Debt service of US$10 million represented about 15 percent of expected

government revenues in 1987, not including unsettled existing arrears. The CAA's efforts to increase revenues by instituting new taxes and by improving administration were encouraging throughout 1987. In late 1987, observers were unable to predict how Chad would cope with its long-term debt problems, especially in the face of a shrinking tax base, which was exacerbated by difficulties in the cotton industry.

Foreign Assistance

Since independence, all of Chad's several governments have relied on foreign assistance to meet current expenses, to finance government and trade deficits, to combat drought and famine, to wage war, and to rebuild from the ravages of war. France provided the most aid, with some also from multinational organizations, such as the EEC, the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank, and from bilateral donors, such as the United States, Italy, and West Germany. Donor assistance has fluctuated. It fell during the conflicts of the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly from 1979 through 1982. Some donors, such as the United States, halted all aid between 1980 and 1982, when Goukouni Oueddei, who was supported by Libya, held power (see Transition to Northern Rule, ch. 4). France, however, continued to provide some form of nonmilitary aid to Chad throughout the period, but it was channeled to the south and not to the central government. As other donors pulled out, the share of French aid relative to all official aid to Chad rose from 23.6 percent in 1978 to 42.2 percent in 1980. In 1982, as other donors returned, the proportion of French aid to all official aid to Chad began to decline, amounting to only 18 percent by 1985. Despite this relative decline and the increased aid from other donors, especially UN organizations and the United States, France remained Chad's most important donor, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total official aid, for all years except 1985. In that year, the World Food Programme (WFP) was Chad's single largest donor because of drought; that aid, therefore, consisted of food aid and not development assistance.

Because of drought between 1983 and 1985 and because of the needs of recovery from the dislocations of war, foreign aid in these years focused on emergency assistance. Famine relief, health, and sanitation formed the base of this assistance, with funds also directed to correcting the most basic logistics problems of food delivery to the country. As the rains improved in 1985, resulting in good harvests, a shift away from emergency operations toward longer-range development planning began. Budget support also increased after 1985 in response to lost government operating revenues because



A tailor plies his trade on a street in N'Djamena
Courtesy Joseph Krull

of the cotton crisis. By 1987 about 85 percent of estimated aid flows provided for development assistance, and 12 percent supported the budget. Disbursements of food aid fell from the high of 176,000 tons in 1985, when the international community responded to drought across Africa, to an estimated 1987 shipment of 30,000 tons, used as food security reserves to relieve chronic pockets of malnutrition. The shift in emphasis accompanied a rise in overall disbursements, which were expected to reach US$250 million in 1987.

Almost all of Chad's external assistance during the ten years before 1986 was on concessional terms. After 1986, however, the proportion of loans compared with grants increased significantly. In the 1983–85 period, with emphasis on emergency aid in health and nutrition, loans represented only 9 percent of aid disbursements. In 1986, with the shift to project development assistance, renewed World Bank lending, and the need to target money to the cotton sector, loans increased to 14 percent of total aid disbursements. In 1987 donors were expected to increase the proportion of loans in overall aid to as much as 33 percent, all on a concessional basis.

In the mid-1980s, foreign donors financed all public investment in Chad. Recurrent costs also were financed by donors, in large part for programs and projects to rehabilitate the economy and to provide basic social services in health care and education. Roughly

half of the projected aid disbursements in 1987 supported public investment to rebuild and expand the nation's socioeconomic infrastructure; about 19 percent supported recurrent costs of the government, and about 21 percent supported operating costs of the parastatals.

A sectoral analysis of projected aid in 1987 showed about 32 percent of donor assistance targeted to infrastructure, 26 percent to rural development, 22 percent to industry and energy, and 16 percent to social services, including health and education. Regional distribution of aid for the same year proposed about 16 percent of project assistance to the capital and its environs, 21 percent to the *sahelian* zone, 26 percent to the *soudanian* zone, and 37 percent to projects cutting across regions. For ethnic and humanitarian reasons, several large donors concentrated their efforts in particular regions of the nation. Italy focused its aid in the Kanem and Lac prefectures, the EDF on Chari-Baguirmi Prefecture, and West Germany on Mayo-Kebbi and Ouaddaï prefectures.

The terms of aid disbursements projected for 1987 were consistent with past trends and took into consideration the financial constraints on the Chadian government and economy. Approximately two-thirds of donor aid consisted of grants. The remaining one-third of loans came almost entirely from multilateral organizations on concessional terms. Overall, 40 percent of the disbursements in 1987 came from bilateral donors, with France the largest (24 percent), followed by Italy (11 percent), the United States (6 percent), and West Germany (4 percent). The multilateral organizations accounted for 55 percent of disbursements, of which the IDA was the largest contributor, providing 15 percent. Other UN organizations provided 11 percent, and EC agencies gave 12 percent.

By 1986 the international donor community, led by the World Bank and the IMF, recognized the need for concerted action in Chad. Once the drought ended and essential reconstruction from war damage had begun, the widespread economic dislocation caused by Cotontchad's difficulties forced the government and its donors to consider long-term structural adjustments for the whole economy. The adoption of the Emergency Cotton Program in 1986 could only stave off short-term collapse and enable Cotontchad to position itself better until world prices improved. Diversification away from dependence on the cotton complex in agriculture, industry, and finance was essential. For the long term, incentives had to be found to stimulate other sectors of the economy.

In 1987 the government agreed to medium-term adjustment targets through 1990. As a result, the IMF began providing budget support to Chad, and the World Bank provided project assistance,

as a part of a comprehensive package that included support from other donors. These coordinated efforts at adjustment focused on defining and implementing sectoral strategies for cotton, noncotton agriculture, livestock production and marketing, rural credit, reforestation, transportation, and human resources and training. Studies to implement comprehensive programs to rehabilitate government fiscal policies and management, to develop priorities for government investment programs, and to address questions relative to the operations of parastatals and public institutions, along with the management of public domestic and foreign debt, were all part of the package. On the one hand, fiscal and management practices would be tightened. On the other hand, the private sector would be encouraged by the loosening of monopoly operations by public institutions.

* * *

As of late 1987, there were few sources that addressed Chad's economy, and no single book dealt comprehensively with the topic. Economic information, however, could be found in general sources, the focus of which was most often political. The best books were in French and included Jean Cabot and Christian Bouquet's *Le Tchad: Que sais-je?,* Christian Bouquet's *Tchad: La genèse d'un conflit,* as well as Gali Ngothé Gatta's *Tchad: Guerre civile and désagrégation de l'état.* Among the few English-language sources was Michael P. Kelley's *A State in Disarray,* which contains a good section on the impact of foreign assistance on economic development.

Several periodicals provided valuable data on the Chadian economy in the 1980s. These periodicals include *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens; Bulletin de l'Afrique noire, Africa Economic Digest,* and the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly reports. Occasional articles in *Revue tiers-monde* and *Courier* were also helpful.

Publications of international organizations and government agencies provided much of the detail lacking in general narratives; however, figures often conflicted because of differing methods of compilation. These publications were produced by the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United States Agency for International Development, and a number of French government agencies. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics



A view of the Fountain of Unity in N'Djamena

SEVERAL THREADS OF CONTINUITY ran through Chad's political development during its first twenty-eight years of independence that began in 1960. Dominated by a series of authoritarian regimes, most under military rule, Chad had no representative national institutions in 1988. Its ruling party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution—UNIR) was organized by the government in 1984; UNIR leaders were appointed by the president from among government officials, and the party served primarily to reinforce government policy. By late 1988, UNIR had not opened the political process to democratic participation.

Political fragmentation also characterized Chad's political development since independence. The Islamic northern and central regions and the colonially exploited south were divided by regional stereotypes rooted in their past, which included centuries of slave raids from the north. Subregional, religious, cultural, and individual differences complicated major regional divisions.

Chad's diverse population was drawn into power struggles in the drive for independence following World War II. Numerous political parties and coalitions sought foreign assistance to bolster weak popular support. The nation's first independent regime grew increasingly repressive during its fifteen years in power as its leader, François Tombalbaye, attempted to pacify this fractious population and transform southern economic domination into political control. Several dissident groups, most from the northern and central regions, united under the National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad—FROLINAT), but this coalition, too, was plagued by factional strife.

In the early 1970s, Tombalbaye contributed to his own eventual downfall by implementing the *authenticité* movement, an ill-conceived campaign that sought to impose southern-based ritual traditions on the nation's civil service. The resulting cycle of public protest and government repression culminated in a 1975 coup, in which Tombalbaye was killed. His successor, Félix Malloum, continued the pattern of concentrating political power in the executive branch of government but was persuaded to bring rebel leaders Goukouni Oueddei and Hissein Habré into his government. Their rebel forces eventually proved stronger than Malloum's army, and he was forced out of office in 1979. His successor, Goukouni, was the first of Chad's insurgent leaders to become president of Chad.

A series of unsuccessful coalition governments oversaw Chad's descent into a state of civil war. The major coalition, the Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition—GUNT), was led by Goukouni, whose relatively conciliatory style of governing contrasted with the previous pattern of authoritarian regimes. His critics considered him weak and indecisive, and he was strongly influenced by Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi, whose primary aims were to install a sympathetic Muslim leader in Chad, expand Libya's influence in the region, and reduce Western influence across the continent.

A salient feature of Chad's foreign policy since independence has been foreign intervention—especially by Libya, Chad's aggressive neighbor to the north, and France, the former colonial power. Libya took advantage of Chad's instability in the early 1970s to press its claim to the Aozou Strip (see Glossary) in northern Chad, based on centuries of close ties among border populations and an unratified 1935 Franco-Italian agreement, which had been ignored by intervening governments. French ties with Chad, based on historical, commercial, political, and strategic interests, rivaled those of Libya, and the Aozou Strip provided an arena in which this rivalry could be pursued. In addition, neighboring countries, especially Sudan and Nigeria, also took an active role in events in Chad, hoping to achieve a favorable balance of power in the region. Other Central African and West African states sought to contain Chad's violence and avoid being caught up in the spreading instability.

Chad's political shifts in the early 1980s resulted from international fears of Libyan intervention through influence in Goukouni's regime, France's revised African policy following the Socialist Party's election victory in 1981, and military gains by Habré. Habré had served in governments led by Tombalbaye, Malloum, and Goukouni, and he had led insurgencies against all. Finally in 1982, with loyal northern forces and French and United States support, Habré ousted Goukouni and proclaimed himself president of Chad.

Habré's patrimonial state was another authoritarian regime. A written constitution empowered him to appoint almost all high officials and reduced the legislative branch to a token assembly. He determined the pace and direction of activity in all branches of government. At the same time, Habré gained popular support by stabilizing Chad and working to establish peace. He also began to reintroduce social services to a population for whom warfare had been the most noticeable sign of government activity.

In 1988 factional dynamics in Chad still resembled precolonial politics. Habré was a master strategist in this arena, and he succeeded in winning over numerous former opponents through

combined military and political means. Nevertheless, the threats of new rifts among allies and of future alliances among enemies still existed, in keeping with the model of the segmentary political systems that had dominated the region for centuries.

To strengthen existing ties among former opponents and to mobilize grass-roots support for his government, Habré proclaimed his intention in 1988 to transform the ruling party, UNIR, into a people's vanguard party. Many people in outlying areas were still skeptical of the need for an increased governmental presence, however, and many southerners still considered national government a northern imposition. Both problems underlined the political challenge that faced Chad as the 1990s approached.

Political Background

Preindependence Factions

Chad became part of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française—AEF; see Glossary) in 1905 and became a separate colony within the AEF in 1920 (see Arrival of the French and Colonial Administration, ch. 1). Colonial policy exploited the agricultural potential of the south, exacerbated regional animosities that were the result of centuries of slave raids from the north, and failed to prepare Chadian citizens for self-rule. During World War II, the colonial governor general, Félix Eboué, brought Chad to international attention by leading the AEF in support of Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement.

After the war, Gabriel Lisette and other political activists, including François Tombalbaye, established the Chadian Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien—PPT). The PPT protected southern interests in competition with the more influential Chadian Democratic Union (Union Démocratique Tchadienne—UDT). The UDT was dominated by expatriates, who treated Chad's political arena as a forum for debate over events in Paris (see Decolonization Politics, ch. 1).

More than two dozen political parties and coalitions arose to oppose this Eurocentric view of local politics and to compete with the UDT and the PPT. These groups were generally aligned as southerners, northerners who sought to share in the nation's economic development, other northerners who opposed modernization, and socialist groups who hoped to replace the European-dominated economy with one oriented more toward local needs. Further fragmentation occurred along subregional and religious lines and over the question of the future role of expatriates in Chad.

Chad's 1946 constitution declared it an overseas territory of France. As French citizens, its people elected representatives to a territorial assembly, which in turn elected delegates to a French General Council for the AEF and to several governing bodies in France. Chadians demanded further political rights, however, including training in administrative and technical areas that would lead to self-government and the right to set their own political agenda independent of other francophone states. The PPT won a plurality in the Territorial Assembly, and Lisette became head of the first government established under the *loi cadre* of 1956, an enabling act that made Chad an autonomous republic within the French Community, instituted universal suffrage, and established a single electoral roll.

Demands for greater local control of politics led to dramatic political shifts in the late 1950s. The UDT, attempting to shed its expatriate emphasis, was reorganized and renamed Chadian Social Action (Action Sociale Tchadienne—AST). The AEF was dissolved in 1958 amid rising African demands for autonomy. A series of unstable provisional governments followed the ouster of Lisette as the PPT's leader in 1958. His successor, Tombalbaye, became head of the Territorial Assembly in 1959 and head of the nation's first independent government in August 1960.

Southern Dominance, 1960–78

Tombalbaye banished Lisette and many of his supporters from Chad and eliminated Lisette's power base by dividing the Logone region of the south into three prefectures. Tombalbaye openly discriminated against the north, ignored the growing national political awareness that was evident during the postwar years, and established a repressive regime that contributed to Chad's fragmentation during his fifteen-year tenure as president.

Major regional rifts were complicated by intraregional divisions, especially in the north, where numerous warlords, each with an ethnic-based following or cadre of supporters, attempted to overthrow Tombalbaye's regime. In 1966 northern rebels united as the FROLINAT. They established bases in Sudan and received assistance from Algeria and Libya, but FROLINAT, too, was divided over military and political issues, attitudes toward Libya, interpretations of Islam, and individual leadership style (see The FROLINAT Rebellion, 1965–79, ch. 5). An important split occurred in 1969 between northern factions and those from Chad's eastern and central regions, which had dominated the group for three years. Northern factions went on to form FROLINAT's Second Liberation Army (see Appendix B).

The headquarters of the PPT, with President François Tombalbaye's picture on the sign
Courtesy Michael R. Saks

Tombalbaye expelled French troops from Chad but otherwise perpetuated the dependence established under colonial rule. He employed French advisers in many government posts and allowed France to control most of the nation's financial operations. Tombalbaye also strengthened presidential authority and resisted recommendations of his expatriate advisers, who urged him to decentralize authority to provincial officials and traditional leaders. Rather than assuage northern grievances or pacify the increasingly numerous rebel armies, Tombalbaye responded with repression. He dissolved the National Assembly in 1963 and eliminated rival political parties. He also jailed outspoken critics and closed down most public media. His repressive style and rebel violence were mutually reinforcing, leading Tombalbaye to recall French troops.

Amid increasing destabilization in the early 1970s, Tombalbaye sought first to protect southern interests. He implemented the *authenticité* movement, an ill-conceived campaign (modeled on that of Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko) that deemed southern cultural characteristics more authentic than those of the north. Opponents successfully exploited public outrage when Tombalbaye required civil servants to undergo *yondo*—traditional initiation rites indigenous only to his ethnic constituency among the Sara population of the south (see Classical African Religions, ch. 2). Weak

efforts to pacify the north by granting limited autonomy to traditional leaders and releasing prominent political prisoners served only to recruit new dissidents.

After Muammar al Qadhafi seized power in Libya in 1969, he exploited Chad's instability by stationing troops in northern Chad and by channeling support to Chadian insurgents. Although Tombalbaye expelled Libyan diplomats in 1971, blaming them for inciting a coup attempt and inspiring unrest, in general he sought a balance between concessions and resistance to Qadhafi's regional designs, hoping to persuade Qadhafi to reduce his support for Chadian insurgents. Tombalbaye voiced a willingness to cede the Aozou Strip and did not object to Libyan troops' being stationed there after 1973. Chad erupted in renewed protests against Tombalbaye's unpopular and weakened regime, culminating in a successful coup against him in 1975.

General Félix Malloum, a former government critic imprisoned by Tombalbaye, proclaimed himself head of the Supreme Military Council (Conseil Supérieur Militaire—CSM), which seized power in 1975. As a southerner with strong kinship ties to the north, Malloum believed that he could reconcile Chad's divided regions and establish representative institutions. He set a high priority on freeing Chad from French economic and political control, but in this effort he was unsuccessful. He sent French combat forces home, but he retained several hundred French advisers and renegotiated a series of military accords to ensure emergency aid.

Malloum was unable to convert dissatisfaction with Tombalbaye's regime into acceptance of his own. His opponents exploited popular displeasure with the remaining French presence by recruiting new dissidents. In response to this threat, Malloum seized control of all branches of government and, in the increasingly repressive manner that characterized his presidency, banned almost all political activity. His opposition coalesced around FROLINAT, which established alternative administrations in outlying areas to compete with N'Djamena. In 1978, in the face of mounting violence, Malloum reluctantly called for the return of French forces (see Civil Conflict and Libyan Intervention, ch. 5).

Transition to Northern Rule

In 1978 officials in Chad and neighboring countries attempted to craft a coalition that could control the country through military force and still claim to have some popular support. Urged by African heads of state and French advisers, Malloum attempted to bring FROLINAT faction leaders Hissein Habré and Goukouni Oueddei into the government, but these two northerners soon clashed with

Troops being reviewed in 1970 at Fada
Courtesy Michael R. Saks

Malloum and each other. While Habré's troops engaged government forces, Goukouni seized the opportunity to occupy government buildings and claim control of N'Djamena. Talks were held first in Sudan and then in Nigeria, but by late 1979 neighboring states were working primarily to contain Chad's spreading violence and limit Libyan interference in regional affairs (see Relations with Other African States, this ch.).

As N'Djamena became a war zone, with fighting among FROLINAT factions and southerners going on between 1979 and early 1982, outsiders proclaimed the disintegration of the state. Although major disruptions occurred, the government struggled to maintain basic official functions. Executive functions were allocated according to ministerial portfolios and were given limited attention. Many buildings in the capital city were destroyed, but a small civil service continued to operate. Public services were erratic but not absent. Still, the government fought for its survival rather than to protect its citizens, and thousands of people sought refuge in rural areas or neighboring countries.

Talks in Lagos and Kano in 1979 culminated in the formation of GUNT, led by Goukouni, which incorporated several rival northern commanders. Malloum left the country, and the locus of governmental power shifted from south to north, largely because of northern military successes, popular discontent throughout the

country, and pressure from neighboring states for an end to Chadian violence. National unity became increasingly ephemeral, however, as members of this coalition were polarized between Habré and Goukouni. Goukouni was the son of the *derde,* a respected traditional leader among the Teda population of the north, one of the Toubou groups that had generally been receptive to the Libyan-based Sanusiyya brotherhood before independence (see Languages and Ethnic Groups; Islam, ch. 2). In his view, Libyan interests in Chad were valid. Goukouni requested Qadhafi's assistance against Habré in 1980, bringing Libyan troops into the country as far south as N'Djamena.

As head of state, Goukouni did not implement promised democratic reforms, but neither did he tolerate unlimited reprisals against the south. Instead, he was relatively tolerant of minor expressions of dissent, warned security forces against harsh retaliation in the south, and gave local administrators limited autonomy.

Both allies and opponents perceived this relatively conciliatory attitude as a presidential weakness and a hesitant style of leadership. Indeed, this hesitancy was apparent in 1981 when Qadhafi proclaimed a merger between Libya and Chad. Following international and domestic protests, Goukouni reversed his position and balked at Qadhafi's regional demands.

French political shifts in 1981 also had an important impact on events in Chad. The election of François Mitterrand as French president heralded a reorientation in African policy. Socialist leaders vowed to reduce the overall French presence in Africa and to avoid an open confrontation with Libya, a major source of French oil imports. French support shifted cautiously to Habré, who appeared willing to resist Libyan domination with outside support and whose decisive leadership had been demonstrated against French troops for over a decade. France's Socialist Party pursued its goal of reducing its interventionist profile in Africa by persuading francophone states, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to send peacekeeping troops to Chad. Goukouni called for the removal of Libya's forces, but when Habré's Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN) moved on the capital, they encountered almost no resistance from the OAU-sponsored Inter-African Force (IAF). As a result, in June 1982 FAN seized N'Djamena and proclaimed Habré head of state.

Habré's decisiveness and his preference for French rather than Libyan patronage shifted the focus of government once again. He took limited steps to assuage regional dissent, relying on northerners in most military commands and top political offices but appointing southerners to several executive and administrative

positions. Habré also reduced the aim of independence from French domination to the status of a long-term goal. France maintained vital economic, financial, military, and security assistance; underwrote the budget; effectively operated the banking system; and provided a variety of commercial and technical advisers. Furthermore, Habré used French and United States military assistance to repel Libyan troops, Libyan-supported insurgents, and local rebel forces (see Habré's Return to Power and Second Libyan Intervention, 1982–84, ch. 5). French funds also helped Habré co-opt former opponents.

As president, Habré brought more peace to Chad than that country had known in a decade. Habré vowed to remove Libyan forces from the north, reconcile north and south, and establish a democratic state. In his first six years in office, he took steps to accomplish some of these goals.

Structure of Government

Constitutional System

Between 1959 and 1988, Chad's constitution was revised six times and altered by several major amendments. The preindependence constitution adopted by the Territorial Assembly in March 1959 was modified at independence in 1960. The new document established a parliamentary system of government with an executive prime minister. Further revisions in 1962 strengthened the executive, and the 1965 constitution eliminated all rivals to the ruling party, the PPT. In 1973 President Tombalbaye codified in the constitution his version of the *authenticité* movement to reaffirm indigenous values. This movement required civil servants to undergo initiation rites common to some ethnic constituencies of the south. Following a military coup in 1975, in which Tombalbaye was killed, and the general deterioration of state institutions, lengthy negotiations in 1978 led to a new constitution that established an unsuccessful coalition among Chad's warring factions.

In June 1982, when Habré seized control of N'Djamena, he dissolved the existing government and in October promulgated the Fundamental Law, a document that served as an interim constitution through 1988. In July 1988, Habré appointed a constitutional committee to draft a new document to be presented to the government in 1989.

The Fundamental Law of 1982 declared Chad a secular, indivisible republic, with ultimate power deriving from the people. Both French and Arabic were adopted as official languages, and "Unity-Work-Progress" was adopted as the nation's motto. The constitution

authorized the office of president, Council of Ministers (cabinet), National Advisory Council (Conseil National Consultatif—CNC, an interim legislature), and national army. It placed overriding authority for controlling all of these in the office of the president.

President

Article 2 of the Fundamental Law designated the president as head of state and government. He was chairman of the Council of Ministers, with a mandate to define the fundamental policy choices of the nation. The president was the commander in chief of the armed forces and head of an ostensibly civilian government. The Fundamental Law allowed the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commandement des Forces Armées du Nord—CCFAN) to select the president. Habré dissolved the CCFAN when he established the ruling party, UNIR, in 1984. No succession procedures were in place after 1984, and most observers expected Habré to remain in office after the new constitution was presented to the government in 1989.

The Fundamental Law authorized the president to legislate by decree, and he often did so. He also appointed and dismissed ministers, legislators, and high-level civil and military officials. Only the president could initiate constitutional amendments; this procedure required, however, consultation with both ministers and legislators.

The president's international authority included negotiating and ratifying treaties and accords and guaranteeing Chad's observance of them. He was technically required to consult with ministers and legislators, but more often he simply notified them of his foreign policy decisions.

Council of Ministers

The president and twenty-three appointed ministers formed the Council of Ministers in 1988. The council's portfolios included agriculture and rural development; civil service; commerce and industry; culture, youth, and sports; national defense, veterans, and war victims; education; finance; food security and afflicted groups; foreign affairs; information and civic orientation; interior; justice; labor; livestock and rural water; mines and energy; planning and reconstruction; posts and telecommunications; public health; public works, housing, and urban development; social affairs and the promotion of women; state; tourism and the environment; and transportation and civil aviation. The president held the portfolio for defense. Only one woman served on the Council of Ministers. Executive appointments were divided among most regions of the

A woman sells bottles of gasoline on a war-damaged street in the capital
Courtesy United Nations (John Isaac)

country, although northerners dominated most organs of government.

The general responsibility of the Council of Ministers was to carry out the wishes of the president, although constitutional language defined its task as overseeing national reconstruction, establishing a democratic way of life, guaranteeing fundamental rights of individuals and associations, and guaranteeing the effective participation of all social classes in the managing of public affairs. The council was also responsible for maintaining a national army, reorganizing the national police, reorganizing public enterprises and parastatals, developing an effective health care system, assisting victims of war, relaunching the economy, reforming the school system, devising an investment code to encourage domestic and foreign capital formation, reconstructing the communication system, and regaining Chad's self-sufficiency in food.

Article 18 summarized ministerial responsibilities in foreign policy. These responsibilities were to maintain friendship and cooperation with all peaceful countries, to uphold the principles of the United Nations (UN) and OAU, to support legitimate struggles by people under racial and colonial domination, to combat all forms of expansionism, and to practice nonalignment in foreign policy-making. Article 19 restricted ministers from holding a second

office in government, although many government officials in 1988 also held office in UNIR.

National Advisory Council

The Fundamental Law formalized the institution of a weak legislative branch of government. Thirty advisers, who served at the discretion of the president, made up the CNC in 1988. Although they were authorized to elect their own council president and two vice presidents, their mandate was only to advise the president regarding states of emergency and war and to consult with him regarding fundamental policy choices, international agreements, budgetary allocations, and general plans for political, social, and economic development. In practice, the CNC supported presidential policy.

As of 1988, the people of Chad had no elected representatives at the national level. The appointed CNC provided a formal structure for representative government and policy deliberation, but it was entirely subordinate to the executive branch. Legislators effected policy changes only if the president agreed with them.

Regional Government

Throughout the 1980s, Chad was divided into fourteen prefectures (see fig. 1). Each was further subdivided into subprefectures, administrative posts, and cantons. Most prefectures were divided into two to five subprefectures; the total number of subprefectures was fifty-four. Administrative posts and cantons were often organized around traditional social units, especially in areas where an existing bureaucratic structure could represent the state. In general, the national government relied on traditional leaders to represent its authority in rural areas. In many of these areas, civil servants could not maintain order, collect taxes, or enforce government edicts without the cooperation of respected local leaders.

Administrators at each of these levels (prefects, subprefects, administrators, and canton chiefs) were appointed by the president or the minister of interior and remained in office until the president dismissed them. Each prefect was assisted by a consultative council composed of ten or more members nominated by the prefect and approved by the minister of interior. Traditional leaders were often included, and council protocol was sometimes based on local rank and status distinctions.

During the 1960s, the government granted municipal status to nine towns, based on their ability to finance their own budgets. These municipalities generated most of their revenues through administrative fees, fines, and taxes, and they organized communal



The residence of a subprefect, often the only symbol of government in rural areas
Courtesy Michael R. Saks

work projects for many city improvements. Their governing bodies were relatively autonomous municipal councils, chosen by popular consensus or informal elections. Each council, in turn, elected a mayor from its own ranks. The official policy of autonomy for municipal councils was generally overridden by the requirement that almost all council decisions be ratified by the prefect or the minister of interior.

Judicial System

Chad's legal system was based on French civil law, modified according to a variety of traditional and Islamic legal interpretations. In the late 1980s, the civilian and military court systems overlapped at several levels, an effect of Chad's years of warfare (see The Criminal Justice System, ch. 5). Civilian justice often deferred to the military system, and in some areas, military courts—many of which were established by rebel armies during the late 1970s—were the only operating courts. In the 1980s, the government was working to reassert civilian jurisdiction over these areas.

Chad's Supreme Court was abolished following the coup in 1975 and had not been reestablished by 1988. The highest court in the land was the Court of State Security, comprising eight justices, including both civilians and military officers, all appointed by the

president. In addition, a court of appeals in N'Djamena reviewed decisions of lower courts, and a special court of justice established in 1984 heard cases involving the misappropriation of public funds.

Criminal courts convened in N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, and Abéché, and criminal judges traveled to other towns when necessary. In addition, each of the fourteen prefectures had a magistrate's court, in which civil cases and minor criminal cases were tried. In 1988 forty-three justices of the peace served as courts of first resort in some areas.

Chad also had an unofficial but widely accepted system of Islamic sharia courts in the north and east, which had operated for a century or more. Most cases involved family obligations and religious teachings. In other areas, traditional custom required family elders to mediate disputes involving members of their descent group, i.e., men and women related to them through sons and brothers. Civil courts often considered traditional law and community sentiment in decisions, and the courts sometimes sought the advice of local leaders in considering evidence and rendering verdicts.

Political Dynamics

Factionalism

Chad's political environment in the 1980s was a fluid, changing network, bearing the imprint of centuries of factional dynamics. Traditional authority has generally been diffuse, rather than concentrated in a single individual for an entire society. Clusters of descent groups defined the society in many areas. Factions arose when descent groups clashed, and strong leaders sought kin-group support in confronting one another. Social norms focused on preventing conflict through family law, religion, and authority relations, and a key feature of factional strife was the reunion that eventually followed many violent clashes.

As a result of these traditional beliefs and practices, many Chadians viewed politics according to a segmentary model of descent group fragmentation. They scorned the idea that national leaders, in fixed terms of office, could demand loyalties, regardless of the issues involved. From their perspective, centralizing power and authority served to deny, rather than to implement, democratic principles. In Chad, as in other faction-ridden political systems, opposition and alliance were constantly recalculated, as costs and benefits to the individual or kin-group were weighed. Politics were often blurred and not defined in terms of distinct bipolar rivalries.

Factional fragmentation in Chad occurred in response to predictable issues, such as France's postcolonial role, relations with Libya,

the value of negotiation versus armed confrontation, and ethnic and regional balances of power. Rifts also resulted from basic disagreements over policy decisions, forms of retaliation against rivals, and personality clashes. Reconciliation often brought former rivals together in the face of a more threatening opponent.

Factions assumed particular importance after independence because of Chad's diverse ethnic groups, the traditional scorn for centralized authority, the weak impact of central government policies in the north, and the generally inadequate infrastructure that impeded communication among regions. Most important, northern resentment found its expression in numerous strong leaders—in effect, warlords—but instead of organizing under a strong warlord to secede, factional armies in the north sought to wrest control from the government and from each other.

Hissein Habré is an example of a leader whose career has demonstrated skill as a factional strategist. He entered politics after returning from graduate study in France in 1971, but he abandoned his original post in the Tombalbaye government to join the opposition FROLINAT. In this organization, he had personality clashes with a number of leaders, including FROLINAT's ideologue, Abba Siddick. In 1972 Habré formed an army of his own, allied with fellow northerner Goukouni Oueddei, in opposition to Siddick. Habré and Goukouni managed a fragile alliance for more than three years, despite differences in style and ability. Habré negotiated a large ransom payment from Paris for French hostages he and Goukouni kidnapped in 1974, but by the time the hostages were released in 1977, Habré and Goukouni had ended their alliance.

This arrangement did not last because Habré clashed with Malloum over regional and policy issues. Their confrontation allowed Goukouni to seize the capital and declare himself head of state. As minister of national defense, veterans, and war victims in Goukouni's regime, Habré continued to clash with his northern rival over policy, style, and, increasingly, over Libyan involvement in Chad. Habré fled N'Djamena and, with French and United States support, returned to oust Goukouni as head of state in June 1982.

Habré decided he would form alliances only from a position of strength, and he proceeded to defeat, intimidate, or co-opt a number of rebel leaders. He then moved to end factional strife, curb the nation's continuing violence, and extend the reach of government into the countryside. As of 1988, he had been fairly successful in his dual pursuit of national reunification and reconciliation. He had consolidated his control of Chad's fractious population through both military and political tactics, and, following the example of

his predecessors, he had strengthened the executive branch of government and postponed democratic reforms. Habré's authoritarian rule outweighed the nation's strong centrifugal tendencies, but just barely. He defeated numerous rebel armies between 1983 and 1987, and as a result of these clashes, the disarray among his opponents, and French financial assistance, he won over most former opponents.

Among those groups that rallied to Habré's government was the Action Committee of the Democratic Revolutionary Council (Comité d'Action et de Concertation du Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire—CAC-CDR), founded in 1984 as the intellectual wing of the opposition CDR. Under the leadership of Mahamat Senoussi Khatir, it declared support for Habré in 1985. The People's Armed Forces (Forces Armées Populaires—FAP), a former FROLINAT faction led by Goukouni, also declared support for Habré in October 1986, although Goukouni remained outside the country, attempting to negotiate a dignified return. Goukouni's one-time vice president and leader of the Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Tchadiennes—FAT), Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué, was Habré's minister of agriculture and rural development in 1988. The Democratic Front of Chad (Front Démocratique du Tchad—FDT) was also won over by Habré. The FDT was a coalition of groups formed in Paris in 1985 in opposition to both Goukouni and Habré. Led by General Negué Djogo, the FDT shifted its support to Habré later that year. Djogo became Habré's minister of justice in early 1986 and was shifted to minister of transportation and civil aviation in mid-1988. Two other former FDT leaders also joined the government, one as minister of finance and the other as minister of culture, youth, and sports.

Several factions of *codos,* or commandos, were also convinced to rally to the government. *Codos* were southern rebel formations nominally united under the leadership of Colonel Alphonse Kotiga. Many of them declared their support for Habré during 1985 and 1986. Other small groups also rallied to Habré's government in 1986 and 1987, including the Democratic and Popular National Assembly (Rassemblement National Démocratique et Populaire—RNDP) and the Assembly for Unity and Chadian Democracy (Rassemblement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie Tchadienne—RUDT).

A number of groups remained actively opposed to the government in 1988. Several of these formed a coalition, the Supreme Council of the Revolution (Conseil Suprême de la Révolution—CSR) in 1985. The CSR included nominally united remnants of GUNT, which had controlled the national government under Goukouni's leadership from 1979 to 1982 (see Civil War and

A building showing the destructiveness of the Chadian Civil War
Courtesy United Nations (John Isaac)

Multilateral Mediation, 1979–82, ch. 1). Goukouni disappeared from the GUNT command while he negotiated unsuccessfully to return to Chad on his own terms in 1987. In 1988 he proclaimed his allegiance to Habré but soon thereafter announced the reorganization of the GUNT alliance under his command.

Another group in the CSR, the CDR, was founded in 1979 by Acyl Ahmat but in 1988 led by Acheikh ibn Oumar. The CDR formed the core of Habré's opposition in 1988, following military and political losses by GUNT. Also opposed to the government in 1988 were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad (Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad—MPLT), which had broken away from FAP under Aboubakar Abdel Rahmane's leadership, and its splinter group, the Western Armed Forces (Forces Armées Occidentales—FAO); several factions of FROLINAT, including those led by Hadjero Senoussi and Abdelkader Yacine; and the Movement for the National Salvation of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad—MOSANAT), led by Boda Maldoun. MOSANAT, a Hajerai-based organization, maintained its antigovernment stance through several administrations. No remaining rebel army, by itself, posed an immediate threat to Habré's regime (see Internal Security Conditions, ch. 5).

National Union for Independence and Revolution

Habré's political support came primarily from northerners, the army that brought him to power, and civilians who admired his tough stand on such issues as opposition to Libyan interference in Chadian affairs. To broaden his support, in 1984 he undertook a program to extend the reach of government into rural areas, first by seeking the advice of the nation's prefects. Southern prefects advised that in addition to lingering animosity based on the early association of FAN with FROLINAT, which had worked to oust the southern-based government of Tombalbaye, a major concern in that region was the conduct of the army. The army had become, in effect, an obstacle to security.

In 1984 Habré dissolved the CCFAN and established a political party, UNIR. Habré retained broad power to control the party agenda, and he appointed military officers to nine of the fourteen positions on the party's Executive Bureau, which served as the primary liaison between the party and the government. To placate the south, six posts were allocated to southerners.

UNIR was designed primarily to mobilize and inspire popular participation in government and to enable the president to control that participation. Other important goals were to increase the civilian emphasis in government and, finally, to achieve peace between north and south. The party invoked national values such as brotherhood and solidarity, individual respect, confidence, and "healthy criticism and self-criticism." It also developed a repertoire of songs, chants, and sayings intended to bolster these aims.

The eighty-member UNIR Central Committee was important in extending the reach of the party throughout the nation. For this purpose, it employed groups of about sixty agents (*animateurs*) and ten organizers (*encadreurs*) in each prefecture to convert apathetic and war-weary citizens into party activists. Militant UNIR recruiters delivered public speeches on the need for unity, peace, and progress through the party organization and for reduced Libyan influence in Chad. They also helped recruit members to party affiliates, such as youth groups, women's organizations, and trade associations.

The main political impact of UNIR by 1988 was to maintain a cadre of elites on the periphery of the government. The party was successful at orchestrating political displays but had not inspired widespread loyalty. People generally remained skeptical of the ability of government to improve their lives. Rural citizens in particular had seen few benefits of national development and feared

that the government's inevitable urban bias would make life even harsher for them.

The party's effectiveness as a democratic forum was hampered by the fact that the president controlled its agenda. UNIR provided very limited opportunities for debating government policy and had little patronage to dispense, except its own offices. It served primarily to convey to the president a sense of popular opinion and to reassure him that his government was not entirely out of touch with its constituency. In this role, UNIR usurped much of the limited power of the interim legislature, the CNC, and left the appointed legislators to act primarily as bureaucratic housekeepers. Habré reportedly intended to allow for greater democratic participation at some time in the future, but before doing so, he hoped to provide sufficient political indoctrination to guarantee support for party aims.

In 1988 Habré proclaimed his intention to convert UNIR into a people's party, a "revolutionary vanguard," for the purpose of grass-roots political mobilization. To begin this task, he created the People's Revolutionary Militia (Milice Populaire de la Révolution—MPR), but the MPR was not yet operational in mid-1988. As head of the UNIR Executive Bureau, the president was to appoint the leader of the MPR and control its agenda.

The MPR mandate was to reach people through the local party organization in each of the nation's administrative divisions. This structure—subdivided into groups, subgroups, sectors, and subsectors corresponding to the nation's prefectures, subprefectures, administrative posts, and cantons—was intended to provide UNIR with an apparatus for enforcing its decisions and a forum for promoting its programs. It would also augment the government's internal security apparatus.

Political Style

During his first six years as president, Habré's style of governing was essentially to juxtapose spheres of influence, including the Council of Ministers, a few close advisers, and personal friends and relatives, all of whom sought to influence presidential decision making. Habré was at the center of these spheres, each of which coalesced around his agenda. His political strategy was based on a segmentary model that exploited Chad's traditionally fluid, factional political dynamics.

Habré understood factional dynamics on several levels, first as one of the Toubou herdsmen among whom he was born and whose livelihood had for centuries depended on manipulation of the social system to their advantage, and as a Western-educated member of

a small elite, whose political longevity depended on his ability to broker alliances. Habré used this traditional and modern background in his efforts to craft a stable nation out of a divided state torn by factional strife.

That people were tired of war also contributed to Habré's political successes in his first six years as president. A combination of resignation and opportunism brought former opponents into alliance with the president, who often was simply more tenacious than they were. To most of these former opponents, Habré's authoritarian regime was preferable to a return to civil war. Factional disputes were not always resolved; sometimes they were submerged and could be expected to recur.

Habré's military style was characterized as smart, tough, and decisive. Observers described him as a pragmatic military leader, undeterred by bureaucratic and political niceties and undistracted by sentiment, ideology, or foreign entanglements. Although he had a sizable following among civilians, as of 1988 he still governed largely as a military officer. He had not made the shift in style from supervising a military bureaucracy, in which orders were given and obeyed, to overseeing a civilian government that required broad consensus formation. Political communication was generally one directional, from the president down.

Habré established a reputation for ignoring seniority in making assignments, and, as a result, officers sometimes reported to their juniors when working on specific projects. One military commander, Hassane Djamouss, whose 1987 successes led to the rout of Libyan forces from much of the north, became a well-known example of this feature of Habré's style (see Repelling Libya's Occupying Force, 1985–87, ch. 5). Djamouss was a former minister of the civil service, trained as a livestock technician, but correctly judged by Habré to be a master strategist.

Habré also developed the reputation as a manager who set overall goals for his subordinates and left the mechanics of accomplishing those goals to lower-level managers. This decentralized responsibility and decision-making authority accorded well with traditional values of individualism held by many Chadian ethnic groups, and it had worked well in many military settings. A by-product of this feature of Habré's style was that officials with delegated responsibility commonly bypassed bureaucratic regulations in order to accomplish their goal. Adhering to the chain of command was not the measure of success in Chad's government of the 1980s.

Habré made several cautious attempts to bring peripheral ethnic groups into the political process. Most high civilian and military appointments were from his own or a closely related ethnic

President Hissein Habré (in white) at a 1985 meeting of the United Nations Development Programme
Courtesy United Nations

group, but he appointed southerners and other non-Toubou civilians to several executive and administrative positions, despite occasional bureaucratic snarls that resulted from these attempts at national reconciliation.

Faced with internal threats to his regime, Habré's reaction was essentially repressive. Political opponents were often imprisoned or had their travel restricted. He broadened intelligence-gathering networks within the military (in 1986, for example, in response to growing opposition within the army) and expanded the power of the Presidential Guard (see The Chadian National Armed Forces, ch. 5). At the same time, he believed in his own power to "rehabilitate" and co-opt former opponents and was sometimes successful in gaining a measure of their trust.

During its first nearly three decades of independence, Chad had a strong president and weak state institutions, but it also enjoyed some benefits of the weakness of the state. It had been spared much of the flamboyant political posturing that was evident in a few more peaceful and prosperous nations. Habré had not squandered public resources on grandiose monuments to himself, nor had he encouraged a sycophantic cult of personality. Public office was not yet synonymous with extraordinary wealth, and, as a result, public cynicism toward government in the 1980s was surprisingly low.

Mass Media

Communication across Chad's troubled regional boundaries was difficult in the late 1980s. Even telephone service was erratic and subject to frequent interruption (see Communications, ch. 3). Media development had been slowed by security problems, infrastructural weakness, and general economic disarray. During the 1980s, some UN assistance was earmarked for improving print and broadcast media, but in a few cases, damaged equipment was destroyed as soon as it was repaired, and in general progress was slow.

In 1988 Chad's only radio network, Radiodiffusion Nationale Tchadienne (RNT), was able to reach the entire country through transmitters located at N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, and Abéché. RNT's *Voix de l'unité et du progrès* (Voice of Unity and Progress) broadcast news in French three times a day, as well as a variety of programs in Chadian Arabic and several local languages. Estimates of the number of radio receivers operating in Chad in the late 1980s ranged from 100,000 to 1 million. No television service was available, but in September 1988 France agreed to provide CFA F185 million to install a television station at N'Djamena to reach the surrounding area.

Print media, too, were limited by their lack of capital and equipment and by travel and communications difficulties. In 1988 the government-owned Chadian Press Agency (Agence Tchadienne de Presse) published a daily bulletin, *Info-Tchad,* in French, but its circulation was only 1,500. The UNIR information office also published a weekly newsletter, *Al Watan,* in French and Arabic. French newspapers such as *Le Monde* were also available, and government communiqués were circulated in most cities.

All media were owned and controlled by the government. Even the underground publication of antigovernment views was relatively rare, although Radio Bardaï broadcast antigovernment views on behalf of opposition groups, usually in Chadian Arabic. Chad's small journalistic community looked forward to the improvement of nationwide media as a means of educating and unifying the population.

Foreign Relations

Chad lacked established channels for foreign policy debate in the late 1980s. Few people were accustomed to formulating or expressing foreign policy concerns beyond the desire for peace and an end to foreign intervention. As a result, Chad's foreign policy reflected its colonial past, economic and military needs, and the

quest for national sovereignty. Habré's overall plan for reinforcing national sovereignty was to eliminate Libyan intervention in the north, to reduce the nation's dependence on France, and, eventually, to proclaim a democratic state of Chad. Consistent with its liberal economy and relatively small public sector, Chad's foreign policy was pro-Western in the 1980s, but the basis for this orientation was rooted in its dependence on Western military assistance and foreign aid and investment, rather than on popular concern about superpower rivalries. Habré maintained in 1988 that the spread of communism posed a threat to Africa, but he intended, nonetheless, to assert Chad's nonalignment and autonomy from the West once peace with its neighbors was established.

After independence, Chad's importance in Africa increased, although its new stature derived more from its weaknesses than its strengths. It struggled to establish and maintain sovereignty within its boundaries, as Libya claimed a portion of northern Chad. Numerous dissidents within Chad considered Libyan domination preferable to Habré's administration of the 1980s or continued dependence on France. Some neighboring states hoped Chad would solve its internal problems and serve as a buffer against Libyan advances into the Sahel (see Glossary), pacify its warring rebel armies, and avoid destabilizing their regimes. Other neighboring states, especially Libya and Nigeria, hoped to exploit Chad's mineral wealth, and most of Chad's Arab neighbors saw it as a potential ally in the effort to weaken Western influence on the continent.

Libya and France were the key power brokers in Chad. Chad's relations with these two nations were interrelated throughout the 1980s, complementing one another in many instances. France's ties with its former colony were rooted in historical, economic, political, and security issues. Libya's long-standing ties with Chad, conversely, had cultural, ethnic, and religious bases—less important to governments but more so to many people in northern Chad. France and Libya also formulated policies toward Chad in the context of their own ambivalent relationship. France imported Libyan oil at favorable prices and assisted Libya's burgeoning military institutions yet faced the dilemma of arming both sides in the dispute over the Aozou Strip.

Within this foreign relations triangle, Chad's national leaders confronted many of the foreign policy issues that plagued the entire continent in the 1980s—the legacy of arbitrary colonial boundaries, the perceived need for strong armies to defend them, continuing postcolonial dependence, questions regarding the role of Islam in a secular state, and the problem of establishing African forms of

democracy under these conditions. Viewed in this light, Chad's political environment was a microcosm of Africa's international concerns.

Relations with France

France was Chad's most important foreign donor and patron for the first three decades following independence in 1960. At the end of the 1980s, economic ties were still strong, and France provided development assistance in the form of loans and grants. It was no longer Chad's leading customer for agricultural exports, but it continued to provide substantial military support.

Chad remained a member of the African Financial Community (Communauté Financière Africaine—CFA; for value of the CFA franc—see Glossary), which linked the value of its currency, the CFA franc, to the French franc. French private and government investors owned a substantial portion of Chad's industrial and financial institutions, and the French treasury backed the Bank of Central African States (Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale—BEAC), which served as the central bank for Chad and six other member nations (see Banking and Finance, ch. 3). Chad's dependence on France declined slightly during Habré's tenure as president, in part because other foreign donors and investors returned as the war subsided and also because increased rainfall after 1985 improved food production. French official attitudes toward Chad had changed from the 1970s policies under the leadership of Giscard d'Estaing to those of the Mitterrand era of the 1980s. Economic, political, and strategic goals, which had emphasized maintaining French influence in Africa, exploiting Chad's natural resources, and bolstering francophone Africa's status as a bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence, had been replaced by nominally anticolonialist attitudes. The election in France of the Socialist government in 1981 had coincided with conditions of near-anarchy in Chad, leading France's Socialist Party to reaffirm its ideological stance against high-profile intervention in Africa. Hoping to avoid a confrontation with Libya, another important client state in the region, President Mitterrand limited French military involvement to a defense of the region surrounding N'Djamena in 1983 and 1984. Then, gradually increasing its commitment to reinforce Habré's presidency, France once again increased its military activity in Chad (see The French Military Role in Chad, ch. 5).

Relations with Libya

Chad's relations with Libya, arising out of centuries of ethnic, religious, and commercial ties, were more complex than those with

France. Under French and Italian colonial domination, respectively, Chad and Libya had diverged in orientation and development. But even after Chad's independence in 1960, many northerners still identified more closely with people in Libya than with the southern-dominated government in N'Djamena. After seizing power in 1969, Libyan head of state Qadhafi reasserted Libya's claim to the Aozou Strip, a 100,000-square-kilometer portion of northern Chad that included the small town of Aozou. Libya based its claim on one of several preindependence agreements regarding colonial boundaries, and it bolstered these claims by stationing troops in the Aozou Strip beginning in 1972. (Maps printed in Libya after 1975 included the Aozou Strip within Libya.)

Qadhafi's desire to annex the Aozou Strip grew out of an array of concerns, including the region's reported mineral wealth. He also hoped to establish a friendly government in Chad and to extend Islamic influence into the Sahel through Chad and Sudan, with the eventual aim of a Central African Islamic empire.

A complex set of symbolic interests also underlay Libya's pursuit of territory and influence in the Sahel. Qadhafi's anticolonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric vacillated between attacks on the United States and a campaign focused on the postcolonial European presence in Africa. He hoped to weaken Chad's ties with the West and thereby reduce Africa's incorporation into the Western-dominated nation-state system. Forcing the revision of one of the colonially devised boundaries affirmed by the OAU in 1963 was a step in this direction—one that seemed possible in the context of the troubled nation of Chad, which OAU members dubbed the continent's "weakest link."

Qadhafi attempted alliances with a number of antigovernment rebel leaders in Chad during the 1970s, including Goukouni, Siddick, Acyl Ahmat (a Chadian of Arab descent), and Kamougué, a southerner. Goukouni and Acyl were most sympathetic to Qadhafi's regional ambitions, but these two men clashed in 1979, leading Acyl to form the CDR. After Acyl's death in 1982, Libyan support swung strongly to Goukouni's GUNT (see Civil Conflict and Libyan Intervention, ch. 5).

By mid-1988 Qadhafi appeared more willing to come to an agreement with Habré than to continue to support Qadhafi's fractious allies, who had suffered losses at Habré's hands. Chadian and Libyan foreign ministers met in August 1988, and the two governments agreed to further talks. At the same time, Libyan troops remained in the Aozou Strip, and its future status was uncertain (see Repelling Libya's Occupying Force, 1985–87, ch. 5).

Relations with Nigeria and Sudan

Within the complex and changing foreign relations triangle comprising Chad, France, and Libya, the large nations of Nigeria and Sudan were also important actors. Nigeria considered France its primary rival in its attempt to chart the course of West Africa's political development. Its generally paternalistic relations with Chad intensified after the coup that ousted President Tombalbaye in 1975. After that, limiting Libyan expansion while avoiding direct clashes with Libyan troops also became important goals. Nigeria sponsored talks among Chad's rival factions in 1979 and promoted a little-known civil servant, Mahmat Shawa Lol, as a compromise head of a coalition government. Lol's perceived status as a Nigerian puppet contributed to mounting opposition during his short term as president in 1979.

The two nations forged stronger ties during the 1980s. Hoping to benefit commercially and diplomatically by expanding regional trade relations, Nigeria replaced France as Chad's major source of export revenues. Bilateral trade agreements involved Chadian exports of livestock, dried fish, and chemicals and imports of Nigerian foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Both governments also recognized the potential value of the large informal trade sector across their borders, which neither country regulated. In addition, Nigerian industry and commerce employed several thousand Chadian workers.

Chad's relationship with Nigeria was not without its strains, however. Beginning in the late 1970s, clashes occurred around Lake Chad, where both countries hoped to exploit oil reserves. Both also sought to defuse these confrontations, first by establishing joint patrols and a commission to demarcate the boundary across the lake more clearly. Then in the early 1980s, the low level of Lake Chad brought a series of tiny islands into view, leading to further disputes and disrupting long-standing informal trade networks.

This relationship was also complicated by Nigeria's own instability in the north, generated by rising Islamic fundamentalism. Thousands of casualties occurred as the result of violent clashes in Nigeria throughout the 1980s. Most religious violence was domestic in origin, but Nigerian police arrested a few Libyans, and Nigerian apprehension of Libyan infiltration through Chad intensified.

Nigeria's 1983 economic austerity campaign also produced strains with neighboring states, including Chad. Nigeria expelled several hundred thousand foreign workers, mostly from its oil industry, which faced drastic cuts as a result of declining world oil prices.

At least 30,000 of those expelled were Chadians. Despite these strains, however, Nigerians had assisted in the halting process of achieving stability in Chad, and both nations reaffirmed their intention to maintain close ties.

Sudan, Chad's neighbor to the east, responded to Chad's conflict with Libya based on its own regional, ethnic, and cultural tensions. In Sudan, the Islamic northern region had generally dominated the non-Muslim south. Sudan's ties with Libya, although cautious during the 1970s, warmed during the 1980s, strengthening N'Djamena's fears of insurgency from the east.

The populations of eastern Chad and western Sudan established social and religious ties long before either nation's independence, and these remained strong despite disputes between governments. Herdsmen in both countries freely crossed the 950-kilometer border, seeking pastureland and water sources as they had for centuries. Muslims in eastern Chad often traveled through Sudan on the hajj, or annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and many young people from eastern Chad studied at Islamic schools in Sudan. In addition, Sudan's cotton plantations employed an estimated 500,000 Chadian workers in 1978.

At the same time, the basis for political enmity between these two nations was set in the early 1960s, when Chad's southern bias in government offended many Sudanese Muslims. Sudan allowed FROLINAT rebels to organize, train, and establish bases in western Sudan and to conduct raids into Chad from Sudan's Darfur Province. Refugees from both countries fled across their mutual border.

Following the coup that ousted Tombalbaye in 1975, relations between presidents Jaafar an Numayri and Malloum were surprisingly cordial, in part because both nations feared Libyan destabilization. Sudan sponsored talks among Chad's rebel army leaders in the late 1970s and urged Malloum to incorporate them into his government. (Numayri promoted the talents and intelligence of Habré, in particular, and persuaded Malloum to appoint Habré to political office in 1978.) These ties were strained in part because of Numayri's warming relations with Libyan leader Qadhafi.

As violence in Chad increased between 1979 and 1982, Sudan faced its own internal rebellion, and relations deteriorated after Numayri was ousted in 1983. In 1988 Habré assailed Sudan for allowing Libyan troops to be stationed along Chad's border and for continuing to allow assaults on Chadian territory from Sudan.

Relations with Other African States

Chad maintained generally close ties with its other African neighbors, but the primary base of these ties were Chad's economic and

security needs, together with other governments' concerns for regional stability. Overall, African states sought to protect their own interests—to isolate or contain Chad's continuing violence without becoming involved militarily. As France was attempting to transfer more responsibility to former colonies and subregional powers, francophone African leaders urged each other and the former colonial power to increase assistance to Chad. Each side partially succeeded.

African states had other reasons for ambivalence toward Chad in addition to their own security concerns. Chad's long-standing unrest, border conflicts, overall instability, and poverty contributed to its image as a relatively unimportant ally. It underwent frequent shifts in government; from 1979 to 1982, it was not always clear who was in charge. In 1982 Chad's new president, Habré, appeared to some African heads of state to be a Paris-educated northerner with aristocratic pretensions, who had not done enough to win their support.

Because of Chad's landlocked status and limited air transport service, Cameroon was an important neighbor and ally throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s. Imports and exports were shipped between Yaoundé and N'Djamena by rail and road, as were military and food assistance shipments. Cameroon became an increasingly important trading partner during the 1980s, following unsuccessful attempts in the 1970s to conclude multilateral trade agreements with Congo and Central African Republic. In 1987 Cameroon was Chad's third largest source of imports after France and the United States, and Cameroon purchased Chadian cotton and agricultural products.

The Cameroonian town of Kousséri had been an important supply center and refuge for Chadians during the worst violence of the late 1970s (see fig. 8). The population of the town increased from 10,000 to 100,000 in 1979 and 1980. Cameroon's government urged France to increase assistance to stem Libyan advances because officials feared direct confrontation with Libyan troops and the influx of weapons and refugees from Chad.

Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko was one of President Habré's most consistent allies in Central Africa. Even before Habré seized power in 1982, Mobutu's desire to lead Africa's pro-Western, anti-Qadhafi efforts and to compete with Nigeria as a subregional power had led him to provide military training and troops for the IAF in Chad.

Chad's relations with Central African Republic were not cordial, but the two nations were generally on good terms. Central African Republic controlled another important access route, and the two

An American C-5A delivers weapons at N'Djamena Airport
Courtesy Joseph Krull

nations had concluded a number of agreements regarding trade, transportation, and communication. Chad's President Tombalbaye had clashed with the former president of Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, over the establishment of a central African customs union in the late 1960s, however, leading Tombalbaye to close their common border. After this occurrence, Central African Republic remained fairly aloof from Chad's economic and security problems. Some Chadian refugees crossed into Central African Republic during the 1980s, but Bangui's major concern was preventing Chad's ongoing turmoil from spreading across its southern border.

Niger and Chad shared a number of common features of post-independence political development, but these two landlocked, poor nations were unable to contribute noticeably to each other's progress. The inhabitants of their northern provinces—primarily Tuareg in Niger and Toubou groups in Chad—were both referred to by Libyan leader Qadhafi as his ethnic constituents, and both nations complained of Libyan insurgence in these mineral-rich areas. At the same time, important segments of both societies supported Qadhafi's goal of establishing a Central African Islamic empire. Both nations also shared the dual heritage of Muslim and Christian influences and regional economic inequities, and both found themselves overshadowed by Nigeria's wealth and large population.

Chad had become one of Africa's intractable dilemmas in the 1970s, confounding leaders who sought peace and prosperity for the continent as a whole. Chad's conflict with Libya became symbolic of the OAU's frustrated attempts to impose a coherent framework on Africa, and it defied the OAU resolution to uphold colonially imposed boundaries and settle inter-African disputes peacefully. The OAU formed a series of ad hoc committees to mediate the Chad-Libya dispute, and in 1988 the six committee members—Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal—succeeded in bringing together foreign ministers from Chad and Libya to pursue diplomatic recognition and peace talks. The committee also requested written documentation of each side's claims to the Aozou Strip in the hope of finding a legal channel for curbing violence there.

Relations with the United States

United States interest in Chad increased steadily during the 1980s, as United States opposition to Libyan leader Qadhafi intensified and Chadian instability threatened to contribute to regional destabilization. During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States and Chad had maintained fairly low-level economic ties, including investment guarantees and project aid, such as Peace Corps involvement. Drought in the early 1970s brought United States food and agricultural aid to remote areas, including grain supplies, animal health services, and technical assistance. Other economic agreements included road building in the Lake Chad area and rural community development.

Although the United States considered Chad part of France's sphere of influence, it also provided a low level of military assistance until 1977. President Malloum's 1978 request for increased military aid to fight the FROLINAT insurgency coincided with a marked increase in Soviet activity in Africa, especially in Ethiopia, and increased Soviet arms shipments to Libya. United States relations with African states were redefined in accordance with the new strategic value assigned to African allies, and United States foreign policy shifted accordingly. Thus, in the 1980s United States interest and involvement in Chad increased.

For a time in the early 1980s, the United States commitment to military support for Habré was more enthusiastic than that of France, which hoped to preserve its relationship with Libya. Although military and financial aid to Habré increased, by 1988 United States advisers had begun to stress the need to reconcile warring factions and pacify rebel groups within Chad. United States support to Chad included several economic and military aid

agreements, including training programs to improve the effectiveness of Habré's administration and to bolster public confidence in the government and intelligence-sharing to assist in countering Libyan forces in 1987.

Relations with Arab States

Despite centuries-old cultural ties to Arab North Africa, Chad maintained few significant ties to North African or Middle Eastern states in the 1980s. (Ties with Israel had been severed in 1972.) President Habré hoped to pursue greater solidarity with Arab nations in the future, however, viewing closer relations with Arab states as a potential opportunity to break out of his nation's postcolonial dependence and assert Chad's unwillingness to serve as an arena for superpower rivalries. In addition, as a northern Muslim, Habré represented a constituency that favored Afro-Arab solidarity, and he hoped Islam would provide a basis for national unity in the long term. For these reasons, he was expected to seize opportunities during the 1990s to pursue closer ties with Arab nations.

During the 1980s, several Arab states had supported Libyan claims to the Aozou Strip. Algeria was among the most outspoken of these states and provided training for anti-Habré forces, although most recruits for its training programs were from Nigeria or Cameroon, recruited and flown to Algeria by Libya. By the end of 1987, Algiers and N'Djamena were negotiating to improve relations. Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party also sent troops to support Qadhafi's efforts against Chad in 1987, but other Arab states and the League of Arab States (Arab League) limited their involvement to expressions of hope that the dispute over the Aozou Strip could be settled peacefully.

* * *

Several scholars have analyzed Chad's political development during the 1980s. Robert Buijtenhuijs, in *Le Frolinat et les révoltes populaires du Tchad, 1965–1976* provides background on the role of the opposition coalition in shaping the political environment. Bernard Lanne's *Tchad-Libye: La querelle des frontières* analyzes the development of the dispute over the Aozou Strip. Virginia M. Thompson and Richard Adloff's *Conflict in Chad* provides valuable perspectives on attempts to bolster the faltering state in recent decades. Lanne's "Chad—Recent History" in *Africa South of the Sahara, 1988* synthesizes Chad's complex political dynamics in a brief, coherent narrative. William J. Foltz's *Chad's Third Republic*

assesses President Habré's political success and prospects for the future. Several of René Lemarchand's publications—in particular, "Chad: The Road to Partition" and "Chad: The Misadventures of the North-South Dialectic"—provide insight into factional politics in segmentary lineage-based societies.

Other valuable works include Samuel Decalo's *Historical Dictionary of Chad* (1987 edition), which presents concise political entries and a comprehensive bibliography. Gali Ngothé Gatta's *Tchad: Guerre civile et désagrégation de l'état* and Michael P. Kelley's *A State in Disarray* assess internal and external factors contributing to Chad's political turmoil. Pearl T. Robinson's "Playing the Arab Card" describes Libya's evolving role, and Kola Olufemi's "Chad: From Civil Strife to Big Power Rivalry" traces the rising external involvement in Chad's political drama. Finally, several interviews with President Habré illuminate his political views. Selections from these are found in *Courier* (March-April 1987), Jean-Jacques Lafaye's "Consolider la victoire," and Guy Jérémie Ngansop's *Tchad: Vingt ans de crise.*

A variety of periodicals provide coverage of events in Chad, including *Africa Economic Digest, Africa Report, Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Today, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia* published by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, Le Monde, Politique africaine, Politique internationale, Washington Post* and *West Africa. Africa Contemporary Record* provides annual updates on political and economic developments and valuable chapters on France in Africa and the Organization for African Unity. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security

An elderly hunter from southern Chad

AFTER CHAD GAINED its independence in 1960, its national army consisted of only about 400 men, mostly members of the Sara ethnic group who had distinguished themselves in French army service during World War II and later in Algeria and Indochina. By the mid-1960s, however, rebellion in northern and eastern Chad necessitated the enlargement of this army. The rebellion also caused French forces stationed in nearby countries to intervene repeatedly to assist the Chadian government.

By 1979 conditions had become chaotic. As many as eleven separate factional armies were contending for control, generating alliances and schisms at a bewildering rate. In the capital of N'Djamena, after the national army had been pushed aside, the two main northern rivals, Goukouni Oueddei and Hissein Habré, struggled for domination. Libya's intervention in 1980 on behalf of Goukouni resulted in the defeat of Habré's army. With only a few hundred of his hardiest followers remaining, Habré was forced to seek a haven in western Sudan. But after Libya withdrew under international pressure, Habré's revitalized army fought its way back to the capital, and he assumed power in 1982.

The confused pattern of civil warfare continued, but Habré gradually consolidated his political position and brought the resistance in the south under control. With the help of a French expedition, he repelled a new offensive from the north in 1983 that had been mounted by a coalition of opponents under Goukouni's leadership and backed by Libya's armor and air power. In 1986 a split developed among the insurgents in the north when the major part of Goukouni's army turned against the Libyans. Joined by these rebel forces, Habré's army was strong enough in early 1987 to wage a successful campaign to clear the Libyan invaders from most of Chad's vast northern territories and to threaten the Aozou Strip (see Glossary), which Libya had occupied since 1972.

In 1983 the military arm of Habré's movement became the nucleus of a new national army, the Chadian National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes—FANT). By 1987 FANT had evolved into a potent, mobile, and battle-tested military organization. It had acquired modern arms adapted to the rigorous conditions of the far-flung arena of conflict in the north. In addition to receiving arms deliveries from France and the United States, FANT had captured a large stock of Libyan armored vehicles, missiles, artillery, and matériel. In its stricken financial state,

the country continued to be dependent on its Western backers for munitions and fuel, as well as maintenance and training support for its newly acquired weaponry. Its air arm was insignificant, but French transport and combat aircraft remained in the country. Moreover, the army's antiaircraft missile defenses had effectively blunted Libyan air assaults.

Habré had been remarkably successful in enlisting previously bitter adversaries in a common undertaking to regain the nation's territory. As part of the reconciliation with his former armed opponents, Habré had absorbed into FANT the remnants of the postindependence national army, dissident guerrilla fighters from the south, and most of the rebel coalition forces of his northern rival, Goukouni. Only the Presidential Guard, a select force mostly drawn from Habré's own ethnic group, retained its separate identity.

This large assemblage of manpower, however, could not be militarily justified as a permanent force once the Libyan danger was removed. For the future, a major problem for the military leadership would be the welding of FANT into an integrated force of sufficient loyalty to be entrusted with a primarily internal security mission and at strengths and equipment levels compatible with the country's financial means and defense requirements.

External and Domestic Security Concerns

At independence Chad's economic and strategic importance was limited. Isolated and landlocked, it boasted no developed natural resources, and most of its inhabitants lived at the subsistence level. There were few enduring disputes or traditional animosities likely to precipitate discord with its African neighbors. Because of Chad's good relations with its neighbors, it was a very unlikely candidate for international attention.

In spite of these factors, Chad's vast territories have been a demographic and cultural crossroads where outside forces have often competed for influence. The most significant of these forces has been Libya, whose efforts to assert itself in Chad have historical roots (see Civil Conflict and Libyan Intervention, this ch.). In modern times, however, these efforts have been ascribed to the ambition of Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi, who hoped to impose his concept of Islamic unity on African states bordering the Sahel (see Glossary). Asserting a legal claim to the Aozou Strip in northern Chad, Libya occupied the territory in 1972. To further his claim to the region, Qadhafi used troops from Libya's Islamic Legion—a unit whose members were recruited from among Muslims of Central Africa and West Africa. With no demonstrated economic value,



A former French Foreign Legion fort in Fada
Courtesy Michael R. Saks

the area was useful primarily as a forward base to facilitate Libya's interference in Chadian military and political affairs. In response to Libya's claims, Chadian forces, supplied by France and the United States, inflicted a series of defeats on Libya in 1987. These strokes alleviated the threat from Qadhafi, although continued Libyan occupation of the Aozou Strip left the ultimate resolution of the conflict undecided.

No other adjacent state has sought to stake out areas of influence or to assert territorial claims in Chad. In 1987 three of Chad's neighbors—Niger, Cameroon, and Central African Republic—had only nominal military establishments, which posed no threat to the relatively large and well-equipped Chadian army. Their mutual relations, moreover, were amicable, based on their shared experiences as members of the French colonial empire and continued military collaboration with France. Several regional states, including Cameroon, Gabon, and Zaire, have directly or indirectly supported Chad in its conflict with Libya.

Bordering Lake Chad, Nigeria, the most powerful of Chad's sub-Saharan neighbors, has been involved at various times with Chad in a peacekeeping role. One purpose of Nigeria's involvement was to reduce Chad's need for a French military presence; Nigeria has historically viewed French interests in Africa with suspicion. But a more important purpose was to prevent Qadhafi from gaining

a foothold in sub-Saharan Africa, from which he could further his vision of radical Arab socialism under an Islamic banner.

Chad's other large neighbor, Sudan, had given refuge to Habré and had helped reequip his army after its defeat in 1980 by the combined forces of Goukouni and Libya. Subsequently, fearful of offending Qadhafi and inciting him to aid the rebellion in its own southern region, Sudan adopted a neutral posture. Chad's border with Sudan remained volatile in 1988. Rebellious tribal groups, dispersed remnants of Goukouni's defeated northern forces, Libyan troops, and members of the Islamic Legion were all involved in cross-border fighting. In this environment, banditry could not easily be distinguished from civil conflict.

Since Chad's independence in 1960, the absence of cohesive social and economic forces has produced conditions of almost constant domestic turmoil and violence. Competing groups have tried to protect their own interests by supporting local "armies"—often armed bands of no more than a few hundred ill-trained recruits. Badly equipped and lacking a stable source of funds, these factions turned to foreign patrons to keep their movements viable.

Concurrent with the success of his military campaigns, Habré pursued a policy of reconciliation with dissident groups. As a result, by 1987 he had either won over or defeated all his major rivals. Several former factional leaders who had contested Habré on the battlefield had been granted senior positions in the central government, and their forces either had been integrated into the national army or had peacefully demobilized. As of 1988, only two rivals of any stature remained—Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar. Goukouni no longer commanded significant military forces, and his reconciliation with Habré remained a possibility. Oumar's Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire—CDR) had been decimated in the 1987 fighting, and the smaller Arab groups that constituted his following were of little significance. Nonetheless, revival of these movements with the aid of Libyan patronage could not be ruled out. It was feared that Libya might use support for them as a pretext for renewed intervention.

Few observers believed that ethnic rivalries had been permanently suppressed or that new factional disputes would not arise to threaten domestic stability. In 1987 reports revealed that one small resistance force, recruited among the Hajerai ethnic group, had become active in the mountains of Guéra Prefecture (see fig. 1; Languages and Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Known as the Movement for the National Salvation of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad—MOSANAT), it claimed to have been formed in protest against heavy taxes and exactions by the government, which northerners

dominated. In late 1987, however, MOSANAT rebels had fled across the nearby Sudanese border (see Internal Security Conditions, this ch.).

The Armed Forces

From independence through the period of the presidency of Félix Malloum (1975–79), the official national army was known as the Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Tchadiennes—FAT; see Appendix B). Composed mainly of soldiers from southern Chad, FAT had its roots in the army recruited by France and had military traditions dating back to World War I. FAT lost its status as the legal state army when Malloum's civil and military administration disintegrated in 1979. Although it remained a distinct military body for several years, FAT was eventually reduced to the status of a regional army representing the south.

After Habré consolidated his authority and assumed the presidency in 1982, his victorious army, the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN), became the nucleus of a new national army. The force was officially constituted in January 1983, when the various pro-Habré contingents were merged and renamed FANT.

Origins and Early Development

When Chad became independent in 1960, it had no armed forces under its own flag. Since World War I, however, southern Chad, particularly the Sara ethnic group, had provided a large share of the Africans in the French army. Chadian troops also had contributed significantly to the success of the Free French forces in World War II. In December 1940, two African battalions began the Free French military campaign against Italian forces in Libya from a base in Chad, and at the end of 1941 a force under Colonel Jacques Leclerc participated in a spectacular campaign that seized the entire Fezzan region of southern Libya. Colonel Leclerc's 3,200-man force included 2,700 Africans, the great majority of them southerners from Chad. These troops went on to contribute to the Allied victory in Tunisia. Chadians, in general, were proud of their soldiers' role in the efforts to liberate France and in the international conflict.

The military involvement also provided the country's first taste of relative prosperity. In addition to the wages paid its forces, Chad received economic benefits from three years of use as a major route for Allied supply convoys and flights to North Africa and Egypt. By 1948 about 15,000 men in French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française—AEF; see Glossary) were receiving military

pensions. Many Chadian southerners, finding military life attractive, had remained in the French army, often becoming noncommissioned officers (NCOs); a few had earned commissions as well. The French wars in Indochina (1946–53) and Algeria (1954–62) also drew on Chadians in great numbers, enlarging the veteran population still further. Those men receiving pensions tended to form the economic elite in their villages. As southerners they did not become involved in later insurgent movements that developed in central and northern Chad.

Prior to independence, the French forces had been reorganized to redeploy some of the Chadian troops assigned to other African territories back into Chad. Following independence Chad's army was created from southern troops that had served with the French army. Initially, the army was limited to 400 men, some Chadian officers and many French commissioned officers and NCOs. Other soldiers were transferred into a larger paramilitary security force, the National Gendarmerie (see Police Services, this ch.). Equipped with light arms and other supplies, the army used facilities inherited from the French units that it had replaced.

Because the French army units in Chad provided security, a large indigenous force was unnecessary. Accordingly, the Chadian army was deliberately restricted in size. By 1966, however, the departure of the French administration from sparsely populated Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture in the north encouraged dissident forces in the central prefectures to rebel. In response the government expanded its armed strength to a 700-man infantry battalion with supporting light artillery and also activated an air unit (see The Air Force, this ch.).

The continued insurgency necessitated further enlargement of the army, to a total of 3,800 men by 1971. The army formed a paratroop company from 350 Chadians trained by Israeli instructors at a base in Zaire. In addition to strengthening the regular army, the government increased mobile security companies of the National Gendarmerie, equipped as light infantry, to a strength of more than 1,600 men. A third force, the National Guard (later known as the National and Nomad Guard), which had at least 3,500 members, provided security for officials, government buildings, and regional government posts.

Except for the small number of nomad guards, the army and other security components continued to be composed primarily of members from southern ethnic groups, especially the Sara. Little effort was made to enlist northerners, who, in spite of their reputation as fierce warriors, were not attracted to the professional army. Consequently, southern troops stationed in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti



Chadian military vehicles on parade, around 1970
Courtesy Michael R. Saks

Prefecture were looked upon as an army of occupation. They imposed humiliating restrictions in the northern settlements, and their abusive behavior was a source of bitterness.

The growing unpopularity of the country's first president, François Tombalbaye, impelled him to strengthen further the internal security forces and to employ a unit of Moroccan troops as his personal bodyguard. During the early 1970s, Tombalbaye doubled the size of the National and Nomad Guard and augmented the National Gendarmerie considerably. At the same time, he neglected and downgraded FAT, which the force interpreted as a lack of trust. These actions ultimately contributed to the decision by a small group of officers to carry out a coup in 1975 that resulted in Tombalbaye's death and a new government under Malloum's presidency.

Malloum's military regime insisted on the departure of the French troops. FAT, however, found itself increasingly unable to cope with the insurgency in the north, and, as a consequence, Malloum was obliged to invite the French back in 1978. As part of an effort at conciliation with one of the rebel factions, Habré was brought into the government. Habré rejected, however, the plan to integrate his FAN troops into the army, and his force soon demonstrated its superior resolution and strength by expelling Malloum's army from N'Djamena (see The FROLINAT Rebellion, 1965–79, this ch.).

Organization of the National Security Establishment

By the late 1980s, Chad's national security establishment was a conglomeration of former rebel armies under the command of Habré, whose troops were mostly from the north. The evolution of the national security establishment from an army of mostly southerners was rapid. This change occurred between April 1975, when Malloum assumed power, and early 1979, when the combined northern forces of Habré and Goukouni drove the southern-dominated FAT from N'Djamena.

Internecine conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, prevented Chad from achieving political or military unity. Erstwhile comrades Habré and Goukouni became bitter adversaries, and, with Libyan backing, Goukouni evicted Habré from the capital in 1980. Although forced to flee, Habré had fought his way back to N'Djamena by mid-1982. His occupation of the city was followed by victories in the south against his divided opponents (see Habré's Return to Power and Second Libyan Intervention, 1982–84, this ch.). With most regions of the country now under his authority, Habré assumed the presidency, promulgated a provisional constitution, the Fundamental Law of 1982, and introduced a cabinet and other institutions broadly representative of the existing political forces (see Constitutional System, ch. 4).

The Fundamental Law, which remained in effect as of 1988, declares that the president is the supreme commander of the army and is authorized to appoint high-ranking military officers, such appointments to be subject to implementing decrees approved by the Council of Ministers (cabinet). Article 21 of the Fundamental Law states that "under the authority of the President of the Republic, the Chief of State, and the government, the national army has the task of defending the national independence and unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the security of the country, and its preservation from subversion and any aggression. The army participates in the work of national reconstruction."

Habré, who had personally commanded the major element of the northern forces during most of the Chadian Civil War, retained the title of supreme commander and a large measure of control over the military establishment. In addition to his positions as president and supreme commander, Habré had assumed the ministerial portfolio of national defense, veterans, and war victims. In a practical sense, however, in 1988 the Ministry of National Defense, Veterans, and War Victims was not a fully staffed government department independent of the military command structure.

At the head of the military chain of command in 1988 was Hassane Djamouss, the commander in chief of FANT and the battlefield commander during the succession of military victories over Libya. His senior deputy with responsibility for administration and logistics was Zamtato Ganebang. The second deputy, Adoum Yacoub, formerly commander of the People's Armed Forces (Forces Armées Populaires—FAP), a rebel army in the north, was responsible for tactics and operations. Another former rebel leader, Oki Dagache Yaya, was the senior representative of the FAP units that had been integrated into FANT.

The creation of a five-member military cabinet attached to the presidency, on which several of the ethnic groups composing FANT were represented, was one of the measures adopted by Habré to provide a governmental role for his former opponents. The extent to which Habré relied on its advice on matters of military policy was not certain; some observers believe that Habré's former adversaries had been given symbolic positions having no real influence. The headquarters staff of FANT totaled about twenty officers and was composed of a number of bureaus patterned after those of the French military. Included were personnel (B-1), intelligence (B-2), operations (B-3), logistics (B-4), and communications (B-5). Others bureaus were tactics and recruitment. French advisers were detailed to all but the intelligence bureau (see fig. 9).

The Presidential Guard (Sécurité Présidentielle—SP) was responsible for the personal security of the president and performed other internal security duties as well. Although the Presidential Guard participated in combat missions, it functioned as an independent wing of the armed forces. The Presidential Guard depended on FANT headquarters for administration and was officially part of FANT's structure, but it operated as a separate army, often in semisecrecy. Dominated by soldiers of Habré's ethnic group, the Daza, it enjoyed many privileges and was assigned the most modern transportation equipment and weaponry. In 1987 the 3,600-man force was commanded by Ahmed Gorou.

Except for the north, which had been organized into a separate military region, the country was divided into twelve military zones, each with headquarters in a major town. The senior officer, generally a major of the Presidential Guard, held command responsibility for any military units within his designated zone. Subzones were located in smaller communities, usually under a lieutenant.

The Chadian National Armed Forces

As of mid-1987, FANT had a manpower strength of 28,000, exclusive of the Presidential Guard. At the time of its official



Figure 9. Organization of Chadian National Armed Forces, Late 1985

establishment in 1983, FANT consisted primarily of FAN troops, the well-disciplined and hardened combat veterans who had been the original followers of Habré. FANT gradually expanded, recruiting members of the former national army, FAT, who were predominantly southerners of the Sara ethnic group. Later, additional southerners, the commandos or *codos* who had opened a guerrilla campaign against the government in 1983, were won over after two and one-half years of negotiations. Assigned to rehabilitation camps for retraining, the physically fit among them were also inducted into FANT. Finally, in the latter half of 1986, after FAP, the largest component of Goukouni's northern rebel army, had

revolted against its Libyan ally, FAP soldiers were merged into FANT to join the campaign against the Libyan bases in Chad (see Appendix B).

Under Chadian law, both men and women reaching the age of twenty-one were obligated for one year of military or civic service. There was no systematic conscription system; young men were simply rounded up periodically in their communities and required to serve in the army for longer or shorter periods as military needs dictated. According to one source, very few members of FANT were conscripts in 1987. Women served in the military, but their exact duties were unknown.

The Chadian army has never been organized at higher than battalion level. As of 1987, four battalions had been established within FANT. Sometimes known as "commando battalions," they were far smaller than standard battalions, with no more than 400 soldiers in each. Two of the battalions had completed training in Zaire, and the training of a third was under way. The fourth battalion existed mainly on paper; the companies assigned to it were still operating independently.

The bulk of the remainder of FANT consisted of 127 infantry companies. Each company had a nominal strength of about 150 men but in many cases as few as 100 because of casualties and other forms of attrition. The organizational pattern was flexible; a new company could be formed as needed by detaching troops from existing units and then might be dismantled after the operational need had ended. Moreover, a force of wheeled armored vehicles was organized separately into armored squadrons, each ordinarily supplied with ten or eleven vehicles along with truck-mounted recoilless rifles and antitank missiles, and subdivided in up to four armored sections. The armored squadrons could be detailed as needed to operate in conjunction with infantry companies.

FANT had no separate elements dedicated to airborne operations. Soldiers trained as paratroopers, however, were scattered throughout FANT and the Presidential Guard after they had received instruction from the French teams that visited Chad and other French-speaking African states annually for this purpose.

Because of the chaotic conditions and the severe financial constraints on the government, systematic promotions in the officer corps had been suspended in the 1970s. As a result, many officers with senior responsibilities were lieutenants or captains, or they held no formal military rank at all. Officers of Habré's original FAN were known simply as *camarade* (comrade), and many, like the commander in chief, Djamouss, continued to be addressed in

this way. Trusted associates of Habré were sometimes detached from civilian posts and given temporary military commands.

Those officers of the former national army, FAT, who rallied to FANT were guaranteed retention of their former ranks, but not positions of equivalent responsibility. Accordingly, a major or colonel sometimes served under a lieutenant or captain. On occasion, an officer selected for training abroad might be granted the rank appropriate for the program to which he had been nominated, in effect resulting in his promotion. Thus, Idris Deby, the former commander in chief of FANT, was promoted to lieutenant colonel in conjunction with his attendance at the French war college. With the exception of two generals no longer holding active commands in 1988, the highest rank in FANT was that of colonel.

The main fighting units of FANT, a group that had performed superbly against the Libyans during the 1987 offensive, were young but toughened by several years of harsh desert warfare. Their tactics of rapid movement and sudden sweeps upon an unsuspecting enemy were reminiscent of their nomadic warrior forebears. Decentralized decision making reportedly permitted field commanders to mount major attacks on their own initiative. Limited by poor communications, these commanders, in turn, sometimes described only general objectives in advance of an attack and depended on individual unit leaders to coordinate blows of devastating surprise and firepower.

Foreign military observers were impressed by FANT's fighting style and rated it highly for esprit and combativeness. Nevertheless, the discipline and orderliness of a traditional army were not greatly in evidence. Except for members of the Presidential Guard, who favored the desert camouflage uniform of the United States Army if it were available, the troops did not wear a standard uniform. Personal gear sometimes consisted merely of a prayer rug—which also served as a sleeping pad—and a sheepskin for warmth. Shower clogs were considered adequate footgear, nor were the rations what one might expect in a regular army. Individual combat rations were often no more than green tea, dried dates, and hard biscuits. Occasionally, meat from a slaughtered sheep or camel would be available. A FANT veteran could survive desert heat on as little as one liter of water a day.

Unreliable payment of wages was a persistent problem for FANT troops. The bitterness in the south against the central government, which had resulted in outbreaks of violence between 1983 and 1985, was caused in part by confiscations of food and personal property by unpaid FANT troops. As of 1983, it was reported that FANT soldiers were paid the equivalent of US$140 for each major battle,

although those qualified to fire large-caliber weapons and missiles could earn much more. By 1986 a system of monthly payments was in effect, but, owing to the government's financial distress, both soldiers and civil servants were on half pay. In practice, only the Presidential Guard received its wages in full and on a timely basis. The salary of an NCO in the Presidential Guard was about US$70 a month; officers could earn up to US$150. In FANT, the officer's basic salary of about US$70 a month was likely to be augmented by supplemental allowances based on the position being filled. Djamouss, the highest paid officer in FANT, earned about US$1,000 a month, plus the use of an automobile and a house and other privileges.

Although the military victories of 1987 had imparted a sense of national pride and unity to FANT that had not existed previously, the dependability of the troops newly recruited from other armed factions had not yet been fully demonstrated. In early 1988, long-standing animosities and ethnic rivalries remained, and morale among ordinary soldiers was believed to be no better than fair. Rates of desertion and absence without leave were high, although not yet serious enough to affect the army's performance. Nevertheless, in spite of its austerity, military life provided food, clothing, and minimal cash compensation. For many recruits, these modest benefits compared favorably with the impoverished conditions they faced when they returned to civilian existence.

Training

France has played a paramount role in the training of the Chadian armed forces since independence. In 1980, during the worst fighting of the Chadian Civil War, the French withdrew their training mission and other forms of military cooperation. French involvement resumed in 1983 when Habré appealed for help against renewed Libyan intervention in northern Chad (see Foreign Military Cooperation, this ch.). As of late 1987, the French training mission consisted of about 250 officers and enlisted men. Of the 10,000 soldiers composing FANT at its inception in 1983, about 8,000 had been rotated through French training by 1987. The principal training sites were at N'Djamena, Koundoul, and Moussoro. At an instructional center at Mongo, thousands of former *codos* (commandos) had been "recycled" by French trainers, assisted by a large cadre of Chadian military. A small number of *codos* had been integrated into FANT, but most had been organized into work brigades for service as agricultural or road laborers.

The French-supervised training was complicated by the extreme variation in educational and experience levels of the soldiers. In

some cases, combat veterans had to be combined with new recruits. Most enlisted men were illiterate and did not understand French; when an interpreter was unavailable, instruction was done by demonstration and imitation. The wide range of equipment and weapons in the growing Chadian inventory presented a further challenge for the French instructional teams.

An interservice officers' school staffed by the French was located at N'Djamena. In 1986 the school graduated its first class; an earlier school on the same site had suspended operations in 1979. The annual intake of thirty-five cadets was selected from those civilian and military candidates who had a junior high school level education. The two-year program combined general and military subjects; graduates were commissioned as infantry platoon leaders with the rank of second lieutenant.

A number of officers were also selected for advanced training abroad, principally in France and in other francophone countries of Africa. According to Chadian government data, in 1987 it was expected that forty officers would be assigned to schools in France, thirty-one to Senegal, and about forty to Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zaire combined. A total of forty officers and NCOs had received training in the United States in infantry and engineering skills and in equipment repair and maintenance. In addition, United States mobile training teams visited Chad in the late 1980s for periods of one week to two months to offer instruction in the use of new weapons.

Equipment

FANT's unique combat requirements have dictated equipment policies. These requirements include the capability to shift troops and equipment across vast distances over rough desert tracks, along with the need for cross-country movement to avoid mines and to achieve surprise. In 1987 superior maneuverability and swiftly applied firepower enabled FANT to offset Libya's heavier armor and to reduce the danger of counterattacks from the air. To achieve mobility, FANT favored light armored vehicles and four-wheel drive pickup trucks. The main armored vehicles were French-manufacture Panhards mounted with 90mm guns and supplemented by several V-150 Cadillac Gage Commandos manufactured in the United States. The principal antitank weapons were 106mm and 112mm recoilless rifles and the French Milan missile mounted on trucks especially designed for desert operations. The FANT arms inventory was greatly augmented in late 1986 and early 1987 by military aid from France and the United States. The aid included additional Panhard armored vehicles, two-and-one-half

Chadian troops receiving instruction on the use of antitank weapons
Courtesy Joseph Krull

ton all-terrain trucks, fresh stocks of French and American antitank missiles, and American-built jeeps. Toyota pickup trucks were purchased separately (see table 8, Appendix A).

Surface-to-air missile defense consisted primarily of the United States-supplied shoulder-launched Redeye and Soviet SA-7s captured from Libya. In late 1987, it was reported that the United States planned to supply the more advanced Stinger as well. In the late 1980s, France had provided equipment and training for an air defense platoon of Panhard armored vehicles mounted with radar and 20mm cannons.

Small arms carried by individual soldiers had been obtained from a variety of sources. The weapons included Soviet-origin Kalashnikov rifles, the American M-14, the Belgian FAL, the Swiss SIG-Manurhin, the French MAT-49, and some Israeli Uzis, as well as many rifles of World War II vintage.

The series of victories over Libyan forces in 1987 resulted in a vast accumulation of armor, weapons, and aircraft, much of it in good operating condition. The captured matériel included tracked and wheeled armored vehicles, rocket launchers, antiaircraft radar systems, light aircraft, helicopters, and pickup trucks (see table 9, Appendix A). It was uncertain to what extent this arsenal could be effectively introduced into FANT in view of the operating expense and maintenance burden, not to mention the need for

training personnel in the use of a variety of complex weapons systems. Some Chadian army commanders were opposed to employing heavy armored equipment because of its unsuitability to combat conditions in Chad and to the tactics that had proved so successful for FANT. Others were said to be intrigued with the idea of developing an armored element based on tanks.

The Air Force

The small Chadian air force, which in 1987 had fewer than 200 men assigned to it, was a branch of the army. When activated in the early 1960s, its inventory consisted of one C-47 transport aircraft, together with five observation aircraft and helicopters, all flown by French pilots. By the mid-1960s, the air force had a number of Chadian pilots. Within a decade, an additional thirteen C-47s were acquired, as well as several French-built utility aircraft and helicopters. The capabilities of the air force remained limited to transport, communications, and liaison, however. The air force was used extensively in support of French and Chadian units operating against rebel activity in the north. French fighter aircraft were regularly rotated into the country from neighboring bases for rapid deployment exercises. After the withdrawal of French forces from Chad in 1975, the government reached an agreement with France, which provided for continued French logistical support and training of pilots and mechanics.

In 1976 the air force began to acquire a modest combat capability in the form of seven propeller-driven Douglas AD-4 Skyraiders obtained from France. Flown primarily by French and other contract pilots, these aircraft were used for several years in support of antiguerrilla campaigns in the north. As of 1987, the surviving Skyraiders were no longer operable. In 1985 Chad acquired from France two Swiss-built Pilatus PC-7 turboprop trainers, armed with 20mm guns. These aircraft were suitable for counterinsurgency operations, but as of late 1987 they had been used only for reconnaissance or liaison duties.

The United States had supplied Chad with four C-130 Hercules transport and cargo aircraft in the mid-1980s, of which two remained in operation in 1987. Three of the C-47s and one DC-4 were also still in use. Seven L-39 Albatros jet fighter-trainers of Czechoslovak manufacture captured from Libya were not in operating condition; in any event, the air force did not have jet-qualified pilots. Several of the Italian SF-260 Marchetti turboprop trainer aircraft captured at Ouadi Doum and Fada were reportedly being flown on reconnaissance missions. Armed with 20mm cannons, these light aircraft brought new ground support and

counterinsurgency potential to the air force. None of the helicopters previously supplied by France remained in the inventory as of 1987 (see table 10, Appendix A).

As of late 1987, Lieutenant Mornadji Mbaissanabe was serving as acting commander of the air force. Pilots and crews were of Chadian, French, and Zairian nationalities. France had undertaken responsibility for repair and maintenance of the aircraft, although the actual maintenance teams were of diverse origins. Spare parts and major overhauls for the C-130s were being provided by the United States; France provided service depot visits, crew training, and fuel.

Defense Expenditures

An accurate picture of the actual economic burden of defense costs in 1987 could not be obtained because of the limited statistical data available from Chadian government sources. Officially, defense expenditures came to about CFA F9.0 billion in 1984, CFA F9.4 billion in 1985, and CFA F8.4 billion in 1986 (for value of the CFA F—see Glossary). These expenditures constituted slightly in excess of 37 percent of the total budget in 1984 and 1985 and slightly less than 35 percent in 1986.

It was believed, however, that actual defense expenditures were considerably higher than those given in official figures. Moreover, the available data did not reflect most of the assistance received from France, which was used to meet personnel and operating needs. The expansion of FANT and the heavy financial burden imposed by the fighting in 1987 undoubtedly necessitated a further upsurge in defense outlays. In view of the small proportion of the government budget that could be met through taxation and other domestic revenues, continuation of a high level of French subsidy was indispensable to cover such ongoing military costs as fuel, supplies, munitions, and wages (see Government Finances, ch. 3).

In addition to official budget expenditures, it was reported that a further CFA F2 billion had been raised annually since 1984 on behalf of FANT in the form of "voluntary" donations collected from private citizens and businesses by officials of the only recognized political party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution—UNIR; see National Union for Independence and Revolution, ch. 4). In spite of the fund-raising, FANT troops received only five months' pay during 1986.

Civil Conflict and Libyan Intervention

By the close of 1987, Chad had experienced conditions of chronic warfare for twenty-two years. During the first fourteen years of this period (1965–79), Muslims of the north and central regions had pursued a guerrilla campaign against the central government, which was dominated by non-Muslim, French-speaking southerners. The military occupation of N'Djamena by northern insurgents in 1979 was an important turning point. Although the struggle continued with increasing severity, its shape now changed. Differences between north and south persisted but had become secondary to the developing conflict between the two northern rivals—Habré and Goukouni. Habré's skills as a military commander repeatedly enabled him to prevail against domestic military opponents. He could not withstand, however, the combined onslaught of the forces of Goukouni and his Libyan collaborators when Qadhafi interceded in strength in 1980 and again in 1983.

French troops returned to Chad in 1983 to block the southward advance of the Libyans, imposing a de facto cease-fire and partition of the country. The south and central regions were controlled by Habré, protected by a French line of defense, and the north was occupied by the armies of Goukouni shielded by Libyan ground and air power.

In the late summer of 1986, the balance of military power shifted when most of the troops of Goukouni's coalition rebelled against their Libyan allies. Isolated and demoralized, the Libyans were driven from their Chadian bases in a series of stunning blows by Habré's army in the early months of 1987. The conflict had been transformed from a civil war, in which Libya was backing one of the claimants to authority in Chad, into a national crusade by a virtually united Chad to drive Libyan forces from its territory.

The FROLINAT Rebellion, 1965–79

The prolonged civil warfare in Chad had its origins in a spontaneous peasant uprising in Guéra Prefecture in 1965 against new taxes imposed by President Tombalbaye. The rebellion represented a rekindling of traditional animosities between the Muslim northern and central regions and the predominantly non-Muslim people of the south who had dominated the government and civil service since independence. After unrest broke out in other areas, the various dissident groups were merged into the National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad—FROLINAT) at a meeting in Sudan in 1966, although FROLINAT leaders at

first had little contact with the fighting men in the field. From its starting point in Guéra, the rebellion spread to other east-central prefectures. The struggle broke out in the north in early 1968, when the always-restive and warlike Toubou nomads destroyed the army garrison at Aozou.

The government asked the French to intervene when rebel activity threatened some of the administrative posts in the east and north. A French expeditionary force succeeded in recapturing most of the FROLINAT-held regions, but, after the withdrawal of the French in 1971, FROLINAT was again able to operate relatively freely. Internal divisions, however, prevented FROLINAT from capitalizing immediately on the weaknesses of the Tombalbaye regime. Early on, the movement's ideologue, Abba Siddick, lost control to more militant factions. Goukouni broke with the First Liberation Army, which Siddick commanded, and formed the Second Liberation Army, later known as FAN. As of 1973, northern Borkou and Tibesti subprefectures were occupied by the Second Liberation Army, leaving the First Liberation Army in control in Ennedi Subprefecture (see Appendix B).

In the meantime, Goukouni had been joined by the young and dynamic Habré, who had been named commander in chief of the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commandement des Forces Armées du Nord—CCFAN). Habré, however, was ousted in 1976, when he objected to Goukouni's willingness to cooperate with Libya to further the struggle against the central government. The two leaders also differed over Habré's kidnapping of French citizens and holding them for ransom as a means of raising funds.

Most of FROLINAT's First Liberation Army was reunified under Goukouni's overall command as FAP during 1977. (Habré reclaimed the name FAN for his followers.) Equipped with freshly supplied Libyan weapons, FAP carried on a broad offensive against government troops until a cease-fire was laboriously negotiated in March 1978. The truce was soon broken by Goukouni, whose troops soundly defeated the government army and threatened N'Djamena. French forces were again airlifted into the country and were decisive in routing FAP in a series of sharp engagements during the spring of 1978. During the course of the fighting, much of the new equipment FAP had received from Libya was abandoned.

In spite of the French rescue effort, the Malloum government was weakened both politically and militarily by the defeats administered to FAT, the national army. To shore up his position, Malloum offered Habré the post of prime minister in a government

of national unity under the former's presidency. The new government, however, failed to function because it was paralyzed by factional differences. Clashes between FAT and Habré's FAN were frequent in the capital. General fighting broke out between the two forces in February 1979. The poorly led, less aggressive FAT troops were soon driven out of N'Djamena by FAN. When the fighting ended, the looting and summary executions that followed precipitated a mass exodus of southern civilians. Mutual reprisals followed. Massacres of Muslims in southern towns were countered by executions of southern officials in eastern areas controlled by FAN.

French troops present in the N'Djamena area did not intervene; French neutrality in effect favored Habré, although the French attitude toward him was divided. Goukouni's FAP, meanwhile, had descended from the north to fight alongside FAN. By March 1979, the struggle had resulted in a de facto partition of Chad: the Muslim armies of FROLINAT controlled the capital, together with the northern and central prefectures, and Malloum controlled the five southernmost prefectures.

First Libyan Intervention, 1980–81

Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) through most of 1979 brought temporary reconciliation among the warring factions. Nigeria acted as host to four conferences—the first two in Kano and the second two in Lagos—that gave rise to the Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition—GUNT). Goukouni served as president, Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué of FAT as vice president, and Habré as minister of defense in the government. An African peacekeeping force composed of units from Benin, Congo, and Guinea was also scheduled to be sent to Chad. The units from Benin and Guinea failed to arrive, however, and the 600 Congolese who appeared in January 1980 were withdrawn three months later without becoming involved in any military action.

The formation of GUNT did not end conflict among the factional armies. Both Goukouni's FAP and Habré's FAN occupied parts of N'Djamena during the negotiations of 1979 and after the coalition government was installed, maintaining separate spheres of influence radiating from their respective headquarters. When skirmishes broke out in the capital in March 1980, fighting between FAP and FAN gradually escalated. In spite of brief cease-fires and efforts at mediation, the struggle persisted for nearly nine months without much change in the positions of the combatants. Artillery exchanges reduced much of the capital to rubble. Civilian casualties were high, even though most of the remaining population had

taken refuge in nearby towns in Cameroon and Nigeria. Under Kamougué FAT cooperated with Goukouni's GUNT coalition, but its attacks from the east on FAN failed. Despite FAT's attacks, FAN managed to preserve its supply lines from Sudan by maintaining control over the N'Djamena-Abéché road.

Although French troops were still present, they did not intervene. They deferred willingly to the efforts of the African nations to restore peace and at Goukouni's request departed in May 1980. FAN's superior firepower and discipline, however, was gradually imperiling the GUNT coalition and led Goukouni to turn to Libya for help. GUNT and Libya signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation on June 15, 1980.

Under the treaty, the Chadian government had the right to call upon Libya should Chad's independence, territorial integrity, or internal security be threatened. Armed with this legal pretext, Libya sharply increased its involvement in the country. After Habré resumed his offensive against GUNT in October 1980, Goukouni shifted the FAP's operations to Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, where, stiffened by Libya's backing, his force ousted FAN from the main settlements. In the meantime, a substantial Libyan force of 7,000 to 9,000 troops accompanied by tanks and self-propelled artillery was transported southward from assembly points in southern Libya. With military advisers from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Soviet Union coordinating its movements, FAP seized the town of Ati on the N'Djamena-Abéché road, cutting Habré's supply line to the east. The Libyan army, which included 4,500 to 5,000 members of the Islamic Legion, was then moved into position for a strike at N'Djamena. After a week of intensive shelling, FAN was forced to evacuate the capital on December 15, 1980.

With the Libyans present in force, a period of relative calm ensued, although the various regions of the country remained divided under the control of rival military factions. The Libyan army occupied N'Djamena and was posted at bases in northern Chad alongside Goukouni's FAP; the latter's strength was estimated at over 5,000. Kamougué's FAT, comprising some 3,000 to 5,000 troops, occupied the south. The pro-Libyan Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire—CDR), led by Acyl Ahmat, had about 3,000 men in Arab areas of the east. Habré's defeated FAN, numbering no more than 4,000 troops, had retreated to its original stronghold in Biltine Prefecture and along the Sudanese border.

On January 6, 1981, Goukouni signed an accord with Qadhafi to merge Chad and Libya, evoking a highly negative reaction

among the Chadian factions and other African states. Under sustained pressure from African nations and from France to sever his dependence on Libya, Goukouni in effect later renounced the plan of unification and called for the withdrawal of the Libyan forces. Although Qadhafi's army had become highly unpopular and hundreds of his soldiers had become casualties of guerrilla activity, the haste with which he pulled back the Libyan units within a two-week period in November 1981 came as a surprise.

The Libyans were replaced by an OAU peacekeeping force, the Inter-African Force (IAF), consisting of 2,000 Nigerians, 2,000 Zairians, and 800 Senegalese. Originally, seven African governments had promised contributions, but disputes over financing limited the OAU operation. Because of the vague mandate of the peacekeeping force and the determination of all three countries to avoid combat, the IAF made no effort to block Habré's military comeback after the departure of the Libyans.

Habré's Return to Power and Second Libyan Intervention, 1982–84

Goukouni's army, weakened by defections and dissension and no longer benefiting from Libya's help, could not prevent Habré's advance. By the end of 1981, Habré had retaken Abéché, Faya Largeau, and other key points (see fig. 10). Following sharp fighting in the outskirts of N'Djamena, Habré entered the capital on June 7, 1982.

After initially fleeing the country, Goukouni returned to gather his forces around Bardaï in the far north. Numbering some 3,000 to 4,000, his troops included the remnants of the CDR, FAP, FAT, the First Liberation Army, the Volcan Forces, and the Western Armed Forces (Forces Armées Occidentales—FAO) (see Appendix B). Regrouped as the National Liberation Army (Armée Nationale de Libération—ANL), they were trained and equipped by the Libyans. Negué Djogo, a French-trained officer from the south, was placed in command.

When formed in January 1983, Habré's new FANT had an estimated strength of 10,000; the force consisted of a core of 6,000 members from FAN and 4,000 troops absorbed from other factions. Arrayed against it were Goukouni's coalition forces buttressed by Libyan units and the Islamic Legion, which had crossed back into northern Chad. Together, these forces amounted to about 12,000 troops. Returning to the offensive, Goukouni's army was able to take Faya Largeau in June 1983, following a devastating Libyan air bombardment. Continuing southward, Goukouni's army captured Kalait and Oum Chalouba; however, by the time

it reached Abéché on July 8, 1983, severing Habré's supply line to Sudan, it had become overextended.

As the rebels advanced, aided by the poorly concealed participation of Libya, Habré made insistent appeals for international help. Rejecting direct intervention, France was prepared to go no further than airlifting arms and fuel. Zaire flew in a detachment of paratroopers, eventually furnishing about 2,000 men. Deployed chiefly around N'Djamena, they freed Chadian troops to fight the rebels. The United States announced that US$25 million in critically needed equipment would be provided (see United States Military Aid, this ch.). In a desperate effort to turn the tide, Habré took personal command of FANT, driving Goukouni's army out of Abéché four days after the city's fall, recapturing Faya Largeau on July 30, 1983, and sweeping on to retake other points in the north.

Faced with the collapse of the offensive spearheaded by Goukouni's army, Qadhafi increased his commitment of forces in Chad. Preceded by intensive strikes by ground attack fighters and bombers, a large Libyan armored force drove FANT out of Faya Largeau on August 10. The Libyan contingent of 4,000 to 5,000 troops was heavily equipped and included tanks and armored personnel carriers, supported by long-range self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers.

In response to the introduction of the Libyan mechanized battalions, which led to the fall of Faya Largeau, the French reluctantly agreed to a renewal of direct involvement. They contributed a round-the-clock airlift of supplies and 180 French military advisers. A much larger troop commitment soon followed. The French force eventually totaled 3,500 air force, Foreign Legion, and airborne personnel in what was designated as Operation Manta (Stingray). The first contingents were deployed north of N'Djamena at points on the two possible routes of advance on the capital. Fighter aircraft and antitank helicopters were dispatched to Chad to discourage an attack on N'Djamena. As the French buildup proceeded, forward positions were established roughly along the parallel of 16° north latitude, which the French tried to maintain as the line separating the combatants.

In 1983 Goukouni's forces and their Libyan allies continued to occupy virtually all of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture. Meanwhile, Libya was rapidly building new airstrips in southern Libya and in the Aozou Strip to provide support to Libyan forces and its Chadian allies. Protracted bilateral and multilateral negotiations eventually were successful in producing agreement on a simultaneous withdrawal of French and Libyan forces. Within the



Figure 10. Areas of Fighting, 1980–87

stipulated period of two months, on November 10, 1984, the French withdrawal was completed. But evidence provided by United States satellite photographs made it apparent that Qadhafi had violated his commitment by not removing his troops from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture. Although French president François Mitterrand confronted Qadhafi over his actions at a hastily arranged conference, he failed to obtain the Libyan leader's compliance.

Repelling Libya's Occupying Force, 1985–87

Although French negotiating efforts had failed to dislodge the Libyans from their foothold in northern Chad, Habré continued to consolidate his military situation during 1985 and 1986. At the same time, Goukouni's forces were becoming debilitated because of defections and internal dissension. Rebellion in the south by

codos had virtually ceased by the summer of 1986, as increasing numbers of *codos* yielded to the Habré government. According to Colonel Alphonse Kotiga, the former *codo* leader who had become reconciled with Habré in 1986, as many as 15,000 had accepted offers of compensation and training to become reintegrated into civil or military life. Only about 10 percent could be absorbed as recruits by FANT, but the end of the revolt permitted the redeployment of FANT units from the south to face Goukouni's Libyan-backed forces in the north.

Goukouni's GUNT, reequipped by Libya and now numbering 4,000 to 5,000 men, was concentrated in the Tibesti region and at Fada and Faya Largeau. In addition to these forces, about 5,000 Libyan troops remained in northern Chad. At Ouadi Doum, near Faya Largeau, the Libyans had constructed a new air base to handle bombers and air resupply operations. A GUNT offensive in February and March 1986 ended the military stalemate that had prevailed through most of 1985. The GUNT drive, heavily supported by Libya, triggered a return of French forces, called Operation Epervier (Sparrowhawk). Initially involving about 1,400 men, by early 1987 when Libya appeared to be massing for a new thrust, the French deployment had mounted to 2,500 and included, in addition, a detachment of Jaguar and Mirage aircraft.

Differences within GUNT reached a critical stage in August 1986. Acheikh ibn Oumar, who had succeeded the deceased Acyl Ahmat as leader of the pro-Libyan CDR, had become Goukouni's adversary. The followers of Goukouni, essentially the former FAP, were increasingly resentful of Libya's domination in the north and were reluctant to renew their offensive against FANT. When fighting broke out between FAP units and the CDR at Fada, Libya intervened with armor and air power. As a result, Goukouni's men, constituting about two-thirds of the GUNT army, were forced to take refuge in the surrounding mountains.

A cease-fire was arranged in October 1986 between the government's FANT and the mutinous FAP units, although Goukouni himself was reportedly under house arrest at the Libyan capital of Tripoli. Provided by FANT with rations and military supplies, FAP troops set out to harass Libyan and CDR concentrations. But, under pressure from Libyan air strikes, most of FAP gradually made its way to traditional strongholds in the mountainous Tibesti region or slipped southward to be absorbed into FANT.

In mid-December 1986, three Libyan armored columns attacked the main settlements occupied by FAP in the Tibesti region. They forced the Chadians to retreat from the towns of Zouar and Wour into the nearby mountains; at Bardaï, however, the tide turned,

and the Chadians repelled the Libyans, who suffered heavy losses. In the meantime, FANT troops had assembled at Kalait to prepare an assault on Fada, which was occupied by 1,200 Libyan and 400 CDR soldiers. FANT units had been equipped by France and the United States with light armored vehicles, all-terrain pickup trucks, and antitank and antiaircraft missile launchers.

The tactics employed by FANT at Fada became a model for subsequent attacks on Libyan garrisons. In a series of swiftly executed pincer movements, successive barriers of Libyan tanks and armored vehicles defending the desert track south of Fada were breached in the early hours of January 2, 1987. The fast-moving FANT columns would leave the road to outflank the entrenched Libyan armor, which was protected by mine fields, then open fire with antitank missiles and recoilless rifles, at times from ranges as close as fifty meters. In some cases, the destruction of one Libyan tank induced the others to flee. The final two Libyan tank barriers, twenty and ten kilometers south of Fada, were hurriedly withdrawn and regrouped around the headquarters and airstrip northwest of the oasis; by noon, however, both strongpoints had fallen. Most of the Libyan command escaped by air, but the Libyan death toll was more than 700, and 150 prisoners were taken. A considerable arsenal of weapons, armor, and munitions, as well as armed trainer aircraft, was captured (see table 10, Appendix A).

Striving to reestablish his position and salvage the reputation of his army, Qadhafi built up his troop strength in the region from 6,000 at the end of 1986 to 11,000 by March 1987. Offensive operations were resumed in late February 1987 against several oases. Two Libyan columns attempted to drive south from Ouadi Doum toward Fada, but each was routed by elements of FANT near Bir Korba on March 19 and 20. Pursuing the retreating Libyans, FANT units caught the defenders of Ouadi Doum unprepared and succeeded in capturing the base after a twenty-five-hour battle on March 22–23. Libyan casualties were especially heavy; reportedly, over 1,200 were killed and about 450 taken prisoner. At both Bir Korba and Ouadi Doum, FANT units captured large amounts of equipment intact, including 50 tanks, more than 100 other armored vehicles, and additional aircraft.

The fall of Ouadi Doum was a severe setback for Libya. Deserted by most of their Chadian allies, Libyan forces found themselves isolated in alien territory, and the loss of the main Libyan air base in Chad prevented Libya from providing close air cover to its troops. In general, the offensive against FANT had exposed the vulnerability of Libya's heavy armor to a more mobile enemy. Libya's combat performance reflected growing discouragement and a

sapping of the will to fight. On Qadhafi's orders, a general withdrawal was undertaken from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, beginning with Faya Largeau, which had served as the main Libyan base during the preceding four years. Its garrison of 3,000 troops, together with the survivors of Bir Korba and Ouadi Doum, retired toward the Libyan base at Maatan as Sarra, north of the Chadian border. Subsequently, Libya mounted bombing raids from bases in its southern region in an effort to keep FANT from using the abandoned equipment.

In August 1987, the Chadians carried their offensive into the disputed Aozou Strip, occupying the town of Aozou following another battle in which the Libyans suffered severe losses in troops and abandoned equipment. In retaliation Libya intensified its air bombardments against towns in the north, usually from altitudes beyond the range of FANT's shoulder-fired missiles. Appeals by Habré for French air missions to defend the area against the bombing were rejected. President Mitterrand distanced himself from the advance into the Aozou Strip, calling for international mediation to settle competing claims to the territory.

After a succession of counterattacks, toward the end of August the Libyans finally drove the 400 Chadian troops out of the town of Aozou. This victory—the first by Libyan ground forces since the Chadian offensive had gotten under way eight months earlier—was apparently achieved through close-range air strikes, which were followed by ground troops advancing cross-country in jeeps, Toyota all-terrain trucks, and light armored vehicles. For the Libyans, who had previously relied on ponderous tracked armor, the assault represented a conversion to the desert warfare tactics developed by FANT.

Habré quickly reacted to this setback and to the continued bombing of FANT concentrations in northern Chad. On September 5, 1987, he mounted a surprise raid against the key Libyan air base at Maatan as Sarra. Reportedly, 1,000 Libyans were killed, 300 were captured, and hundreds of others were forced to flee into the surrounding desert. Chad claimed that its troops destroyed about thirty-two aircraft—including MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, and Mi-24 helicopters—before the FANT column withdrew to Chadian soil.

The fighting was at least temporarily suspended on September 11, 1987, when both leaders accepted a cease-fire proposed by the OAU. Chadian efforts to regain the Aozou Strip were halted, and Libyan bombings were terminated. As of early 1988, the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on the Border Dispute was continuing to seek

a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but prospects for success were not considered to be bright.

Foreign Military Cooperation

Since Chad's independence, France has exercised a preeminent role in the military sphere, sustaining both ground and air forces by providing the bulk of the equipment and training needs of the country. French military contingents have either been present in Chad or poised in nearby countries for rapid deployment during periods of instability. Aside from Libya, which had provided massive help to the forces arrayed against Habré, the United States was the only other country that had supplied military equipment. The rate of arms transfers to FANT from both France and the United States mounted sharply in 1986 and 1987 as the conflict with Libya intensified. During this phase, the value of the equipment supplied by the two countries was roughly the same, although the ongoing burden on France—including support for the defense budget, training, construction, and French troop operations—was much higher.

The French Military Role in Chad

Upon achieving independence in 1960, Chad joined former AEF members Central African Republic, Gabon, and Congo in a multilateral military assistance agreement with France. The agreement provided France with use of a major military base outside N'Djamena (then called Fort-Lamy), as well as with automatic transit and overflight rights. In return, France not only was to provide defense against external threats but also was to assist in maintaining internal security in the four countries. Under this clause, Chad or any other signatory could automatically request direct French intervention to ensure the security of its government in the face of insurgency or coup attempts. The French government, however, had the right to honor or refuse requests as it saw fit. Chad also signed a bilateral military technical assistance agreement under which France continued to provide equipment, training, and French advisers in Chadian uniforms. Fort-Lamy continued to serve as a combined army and air base and was one of the main French installations in Africa from which troops and aircraft could be rapidly deployed to any of the former French African colonies.

Finding it increasingly difficult to stem the rebellion that had broken out in 1965, President Tombalbaye sought French intervention to help restore order. From April 1969 until September 1972, the Foreign Legion and other French units supplied 2,500 soldiers, who joined in operations against the rebels. A mixed

regiment was permanently stationed near Fort-Lamy. A limited number of ground attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters supported the Franco-Chadian forces facing the insurgents. As regular Chadian units were formed and exposed to French training, the French forces were gradually reduced.

After Tombalbaye was overthrown in 1975, France's disagreements with the new Malloum government resulted in withdrawal of the remaining French combat forces, although more than 300 advisers to the ground and air forces remained. In 1976 another series of military accords was negotiated covering future French military aid and the transfer of equipment left behind by the French. In 1978 Malloum invoked the guarantee clause of these agreements to ask for renewed French help in stabilizing his regime against the revitalized FROLINAT. French paratroopers and Foreign Legion units returned to Chad in response to Malloum's request but were evacuated two years later at Goukouni's insistence.

In spite of the decisive commitment of Libyan forces in the GUNT offensive of mid-1983, the French were at first reluctant to respond to Habré's urgent request for direct intervention. After further appeals from other francophone heads of state in Africa and from the United States, however, the French launched Operation Manta, a task force of ground troops accompanied by fighter aircraft and air defense systems. Except for several retaliations against Libyan incursions to the south, France avoided direct contact with GUNT insurgents and their Libyan allies. The French presence, however, protected Habré by deterring a GUNT-Libyan offensive south of 16° north latitude, where the French forward positions were established.

Libya's failure to honor its commitment to remove its troops, followed by a Libyan air attack across 16° north latitude in February 1986, triggered a new French deployment, Operation Epervier. The operation initially consisted of about 1,400 troops, backed by air units; continued replenishment brought the total to about 2,500 in early 1987. As of late 1987, most of the remaining French troops were grouped around the capital and at Abéché. The only French forces in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture were a group of 150 engineers engaged in land mine disposal at Faya Largeau. The French aircraft were based at N'Djamena and protected by batteries of Crotale and Hawk surface-to-air missiles; radar units were installed at Abéché and Moussoro to provide early warning.

Although official data were not available, according to one estimate the value of French military assistance to FAN and FANT between 1983 and 1987 was about US$175 million. During the first six months of 1987 alone, all forms of aid, including the expense

of Operation Epervier, amounted to nearly US$100 million. This figure included a US$12 million construction program that would enable the N'Djamena air base to handle Boeing 747 cargo aircraft and a project to harden the runway at Abéché to permit its use by fighter aircraft.

United States Military Aid

Until the early 1980s, United States aid to Chad had been restricted to shipments of food and development assistance. The United States had declined to become involved on behalf of any of the Chadian factions and had no desire to supplant France, which had shouldered the principal Western responsibility in Chad.

Military equipment valued at US$10 million reportedly was delivered in 1981 and 1982, mainly from Sudanese and Egyptian stocks (later replenished) to enable Habré to regroup and rearm after his forces had been driven into eastern Chad by the combined forces of GUNT and Libya. The United States also offered US$12 million to the IAF in 1980, but only 75 percent of that amount was spent. The United States viewed Libyan expansionism as the cause of the Chadian crisis of 1983 and sought to check Libyan involvement. Accordingly, in April 1983 Washington negotiated an agreement with N'Djamena to provide training in the United States for Chadian personnel in a number of military specialties. In July of the same year, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed, which provided for sending military equipment to Chad.

In August 1983, Washington authorized US$25 million emergency aid package to help the Habré government, including the delivery of Redeye antiaircraft missiles and missile launchers. Three United States specialists visited Chad briefly to train Chadians in the use of the equipment. As a further symbol of American concern, two Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, with support crews and fighter escorts, were sent to Sudan for possible deployment in conjunction with French combat aircraft. The AWACS aircraft, however, were not deployed and were withdrawn after about two weeks.

In United States fiscal years (FY) 1984 through 1987, United States military aid to Chad totaled about US$70 million; an additional US$9 million was proposed for FY 1988. Expenditures for training were about US$200,000 annually. Most of the assistance consisted of transport aircraft and aircraft maintenance, small arms, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, antiaircraft and antitank weapons, uniforms, first aid kits, and food rations. The United States also cooperated with France in the air delivery of items deemed critical. For

example, in January 1986 the United States Air Force ferried a Hawk missile battery from France to N'Djamena.

Internal Security and Public Order

During more than twenty years of domestic conflict, the agencies of public order and the judiciary in Chad were severely disrupted. In areas of rebel activity in the south and in regions of the north under Libyan domination, the forces of civil protection and the system of criminal justice disintegrated. Where the national government was able to reimpose its authority, harsh and arbitrary martial law often resulted in mistreatment, torture, and extrajudicial detentions and executions. By 1986 efforts were under way to rebuild the civilian legal system, although long periods of detention without trial were still common, and the rights of accused persons were not fully respected during court proceedings (see Judicial System, ch. 4). The various elements of the police responsible for domestic security continued to reflect the strong influence of the military. Abuses by unsupervised military authorities, however, had diminished as a result of the Habré government's attempt to impose greater discipline and control.

Police Services

Police functions in Chad were the responsibility of the National Military Police (Police Militaire Nationale—PMN), the Territorial Military Police (Police Militaire Territoriale—PMT), and the National Security Police, known as the Sûreté. Certain internal security, intelligence, and antiterrorism operations were conducted by the Presidential Guard (Sécurité Présidentielle—SP). The Bureau of Documentation and Security (Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité—DDS) was a separate intelligence organization and political police force that sometimes engaged in covert operations against opponents of the government. The Special Rapid Intervention Brigade performed similar functions within the military, although it was controlled by the DDS and was not formally part of FANT.

The Sûreté was originally part of a unified force that, until 1961, served all four countries of the former AEF. With about 800 agents, the Sûreté constituted the national civil police and the municipal police force of the major towns. Its duties included maintenance of law and order, crime prevention, maintenance of criminal records and identification files, investigations and arrests, and traffic control.

Until 1979 the National Gendarmerie, a paramilitary body created in 1960, had primary responsibility for maintaining order in the countryside. The force had remained under the command

of a French officer until 1971. Later, in 1979, headed by Habré's political rival, Kamougué, and composed mainly of southerners, the National Gendarmerie had been involved in the fighting around N'Djamena. It remained active as part of the southern resistance to Habré after the overthrow of the Malloum regime. The National Gendarmerie's basic units were twenty-five-man mobile platoons, which had responsibility for internal security and crowd control, and "brigades" (squads) of four to eight gendarmes, who performed ordinary police work in small towns and rural areas. Another force, the paramilitary Chadian Security Companies (Compagnies Tchadiennes de Sécurité—CTS), organized by Tombalbaye in 1967, performed mainly constabulary functions in eastern Chad against smugglers, cattle rustlers, and dissidents. The CTS resisted the 1975 coup that overthrew Tombalbaye, and it was subsequently disbanded.

To replace the National Gendarmerie, the 1979 GUNT coalition formed a police unit of soldiers drawn from FAN and FAP, with token contributions from the other military factions. Mixed military patrols attempted to maintain order in the capital among the contending factions. After the Habré government had been installed in 1982, most of the previous functions of the National Gendarmerie were entrusted to the newly created PMT. Many of the latter's personnel were southerners who had rallied to the government; it was often popularly referred to as the "gendarmerie."

In 1987 the PMT had an authorized strength of 1,600, but its personnel were poorly equipped, often armed with weapons confiscated from former *codos*. The PMT was nominally subject to the Ministry of Interior, and its field units were subject to the local prefect. In practice, the force came under military authority, and individual units were under jurisdiction of FANT military zone and subzone commanders.

The PMN, which in 1987 was under a military commander, Youssef Galmaye, was a branch of FANT; the force performed regular military police duties, assisted in control of prisoners of war, provided route and rear area security, and often took part in combat operations. Its authorized strength was 1,900, and the soldiers serving in it were better equipped than those of the PMT. Training was provided at a military police school organized by the French in 1986.

The Criminal Justice System

The Chadian judicial system and the criminal code were based on the French criminal justice system. The traditional system of

Presidential guard officers in Presidential Palace compound
Courtesy Joseph Krull

law presided over by local chiefs and sultans, however, has been preserved for property and family affairs and for cases of local petty crime. These customary courts, as they were called, have been described as generally effective and fair in rendering sentences. In theory, decisions of the customary courts were subject to appeal to the regular courts.

Normal protections against arbitrary arrest, as well as restraints on the actions of police and judicial authorities, were embodied in the criminal code statutes. Detention without being charged was permitted only for persons under suspicion of having committed a crime. In theory, the rights of detainees included access to counsel and prompt notification of the charges under which they were being held. The death penalty could only be imposed after a competent court had established guilt and rendered a verdict. In actual practice, the judicial system was severely undermined by the breakdown of local government throughout much of the country. According to human rights reports of the United States Department of State, most Chadians did not get speedy trials, and many were held for extended periods before being released without trial. There were only a few trained lawyers, judges, and other court personnel in the country, and law books were not widely available. Although in the late 1980s the Habré government was trying to rebuild the judicial system, the lack of individuals with the necessary

legal training hampered the appointment of judges and examining magistrates.

All judges and judicial officers were appointed by the president. The courts were subject to the influence of the executive branch, especially in political and internal security cases, and individuals regarded as endangering the security of the state were subject to indefinite detention without trial. In 1987 the independent human rights group, Amnesty International, reported the detention of several former Chadian exiles upon their return to Chad, as well as the detention of relatives of government opponents. Although there were no reports of disappearances, nor confirmed reports of torture in 1987, Amnesty International expressed concern over the government's failure to account for a number of people who had disappeared after being detained in earlier years.

The Department of State and other groups have described Chadian prison conditions as primitive. To some extent, the conditions were a reflection of the general poverty of the country rather than a deliberate policy. The scanty prison rations made it necessary for prisoners to have a source of food outside the prison; food was usually supplied by the prisoners' families. Most prison personnel had no professional training, and many prisoners complained of beatings and other forms of abusive treatment. Conditions in government detention centers for political prisoners, where outside visitors were not permitted, were worse than those in the regular prisons. Those prisoners of war to whom the International Committee of the Red Cross had access (mostly Chadians captured before early 1986) were reported to be receiving adequate treatment. As of late 1987, the Chadian government was continuing to deny the Red Cross access to an estimated 2,000 Libyan prisoners of war captured since 1986 because the Libyans had refused the Red Cross access to FANT prisoners held in Libya.

Internal Security Conditions

Following his assumption of power in 1982, Habré faced both Goukouni's GUNT forces in the north and resistance by armed dissidents in the south, principally former gendarmes and soldiers of FAT. Government troops trying to establish control in the south were attacked, as were people and installations connected with the government and the state cotton company, Cotontchad. In response to these attacks, government forces adopted harshly repressive tactics. Reprisals were taken, often against innocent civilians. Suspected sympathizers of the dissidents were likely to be executed or to disappear.



A representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross visits prisoners of war in the Tibesti Mountains Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Claire Bellmann)

The violence in the south diminished for a time after the government adopted more conciliatory tactics beginning in late 1983. In mid-1984, however, the guerrilla groups known collectively as *codos* launched a new series of attacks. During this period, many civilians were attacked by both government and rebel forces. Villagers suspected of complicity with the insurgents were often executed without trial, or they suffered the destruction of their homes and crops. There were also reports of *codo* atrocities against local officials or civilians cooperating with the government. Under conditions of de facto martial law, government troops exercised little restraint in their efforts to curb the rebellion.

Numerous incidents of noncombatant deaths and detentions were also reported in the northern battle zone, as control over towns shifted between FANT and the forces of GUNT. Both armies were accused of executions and detentions of private citizens suspected of collaboration with opposing forces.

By 1986 most of the *codos* had accepted government offers of amnesty, and the turmoil in the south had been replaced by a calmer atmosphere. In addition, the enforcement of a military code of justice and strict punishment of undisciplined soldiers had helped to curb the political killings and disappearances. Many earlier political detainees who could not be found, however, were assumed to have been killed without trial.

As of 1988, most of the contending factions that had kept Chad

in a state of turmoil and instability had been assimilated into the unified military establishment of FANT. Under these circumstances, and with the activities of former rebels subject to scrutiny by various intelligence networks within the military, incipient defections could be kept in check. Moreover, Habré was placing increasing reliance on the well-equipped and trusted Presidential Guard to maintain internal control.

The only outbreak of dissidence had occurred among the Hajerai ethnic group from the Guéra Massif, who had been prominent in the original rebellion of the mid-1960s and in the ranks of Habré's FAN (see Languages and Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). In late 1986, after a series of incidents between Toubou troops and Hajerai soldiers, a group of Hajerai who felt that they were being pushed out of positions of influence formed the underground Movement for the National Salvation of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad—MOSANAT). Its head was an army lieutenant and former prefect of Guéra Prefecture, Boda Maldoun.

Following the harassment of many Hajerai by the military police in mid-1987, MOSANAT armed insurrection in Guéra was restrained by the Presidential Guard. As of early 1988, MOSANAT reportedly was operating from bases in western Sudan, in alliance with the remnants of other rebellious Chadian factions that had formed part of GUNT. The Habré regime faced no immediate danger from the group, but the uprising underscored the fact that failure to accommodate the various ethnic and regional interests in the army could lay a foundation for renewed domestic instability and violence.

* * *

The monthly *Afrique défense* (available in English as *African Defence Journal*) regularly treats military developments in Chad. Its accounts of the fighting in northern Chad in 1986 and 1987 are fairly comprehensive, covering the tactics employed, the equipment used, and the size and caliber of the forces involved. Reports in *Jeune Afrique* and the *New York Times* also provide details on the main engagements. In the *CSIS Africa Notes* series, William J. Foltz appraises the politico-military situation in Chad in the latter part of 1987, in the wake of the Chadian successes. A study by Alex Rondos in the same series assesses earlier phases of the Chadian Civil War.

A concise military history of Chad between 1960 and early 1986 can be found in an article by Bernard Lanne in *Africa South of the Sahara, 1987. Conflict in Chad* by Virginia M. Thompson and

Richard Adloff interprets the sources of the struggle among the Chadian armed factions preceding the Libyan intervention of 1980. Additional and more recent analysis is included in a survey by Michael P. Kelley. An article by David S. Yost examines the French perspective on the warfare in Chad before 1983. *Opération manta,* a book by the pseudonymous French officer, "Colonel Spartacus," provides detail on the political and military aspects of French involvement in 1983 and 1984. Samuel Decalo's *Historical Dictionary of Chad* provides useful information on the various armed factions and their leaders. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix A

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
2 Primary-School Enrollment by Prefecture, 1986-87
3 Cotton Production, 1960-87
4 Production of Selected Agricultural Products, Selected Years, 1961-85
5 Direction of Trade, 1979-85
6 Balance of Payments, 1978-84
7 External Debt, 1980-85
8 Major Equipment of Chadian National Armed Forces, 1987
9 Major Equipment Items Captured from Libya, 1987
10 Major Air Force Equipment, 1987

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Primary-School Enrollment by Prefecture, 1986–87

Prefecture	Enrollment	Percentage of Primary-School-Aged Children Enrolled
Batha	4,861	8.0
Biltine	4,401	14.5
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti	2,542	16.7
Chari-Baguirmi	39,440	33.4
Guéra	25,124	70.7
Kanem	4,898	14.6
Lac	2,441	10.6
Logone Occidental	35,852	70.0
Logone Oriental	43,414	82.1
Mayo-Kebbi	44,510	37.3
Moyen-Chari	64,789	71.6
Ouaddaï	7,653	13.0
Salamat	6,523	35.5
Tanjilé	19,594	37.6
TOTAL	306,042	40.3

Table 3. Cotton Production, 1960-87

	Area Under Cultivation (hectares)	Average Yield (kilograms per hectare)	Total Production (metric tons)
1960	260,000	152	39,600
1961	288,000	340	97,900
1962	300,000	155	46,700
1963	338,900	278	94,500
1964	286,900	365	104,900
1965	289,200	342	99,100
1966	294,100	295	86,800
1967	303,100	404	122,700
1968	241,000	421	101,600
1969	296,600	500	148,500
1970	292,200	399	116,700
1971	303,000	312	94,600
1972	304,300	356	108,400
1973	273,100	380	104,000
1974	265,000	431	114,400
1975	269,800	532	143,600
1976	332,000	524	174,000
1977	318,800	462	147,300
1978	284,000	441	125,000
1979	267,300	511	136,800
1980	179,800	507	91,300
1981	166,500	514	85,700
1982	133,900	533	71,400
1983	137,700	741	102,100
1984	176,100	900	158,500
1985	141,900	693	98,400
1986	147,300	674	99,400
1987	125,400	713	89,400

Table 4. Production of Selected Agricultural Products, Selected Years, 1961-85
(in thousands of metric tons)

	Millet, Sorghum, and *Berbere*	Wheat	Rice	Corn	Tubers	Peanuts
1961	715	2 [1]	21 [1]	7 [1]	201	130
1965	614	3	38	12	232	150
1970	610	n.a.	37	n.a.	303	96
1975	522	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	337	82
1980	450	6 [2]	53 [2]	27 [2]	431	100
1985	526	1	21	48	563	90

n.a.—not available.
[1] 1953-57 average.
[2] 1979-81 average.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, *Food and Agriculture Organization Yearbook,* Rome, 1985.

Table 5. Direction of Trade, 1979–85
(in millions of United States dollars)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Exports (f.o.b.) [1]							
Portugal	9.0	14.9	12.7	10.9	13.9	25.7	15.8
West Germany	9.3	10.1	14.1	5.5	13.9	17.7	10.1
Cameroon	4.9	9.1	16.2	7.1	7.8	8.2	7.8
Spain	12.4	6.2	3.5	1.8	2.2	11.2	5.7
Benelux countries	2.5	2.1	2.0	1.7	0.7	2.2	2.8
France	10.6	11.5	5.2	4.8	5.4	10.5	2.1
Italy	1.1	1.0	3.2	1.4	2.8	2.0	1.3
Other	38.5	16.1	26.5	24.5	43.5	32.2	42.0
Total exports	88.3	71.0	83.4	57.7	90.2	109.7	87.6
Imports (c.i.f.) [2]							
France	35.1	12.6	19.1	24.6	25.8	43.4	48.5
United States	3.0	2.0	0.7	1.9	13.8	19.1	27.7
Cameroon	7.3	12.7	21.8	14.3	15.8	16.6	15.7
Italy	2.4	0.3	1.4	2.5	7.0	6.6	13.4
Benelux countries	2.2	1.5	2.9	4.7	4.2	8.3	15.1
West Germany	5.8	3.5	5.0	3.4	5.0	3.3	5.5
Other	29.4	40.9	57.1	57.2	85.7	73.9	90.4
Total imports	85.2	73.5	108.0	108.6	157.3	171.2	216.3

[1] f.o.b.—Free on board.
[2] c.i.f.—Cost, insurance, and freight.

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1986*, Washington, 1987, 133.

Table 6. Balance of Payments, 1978–84
(in millions of United States dollars) [1]

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Current account (excluding exceptional financing)							
Export of all goods [2]	99.0	88.3	71.0	83.4	57.7	78.2	109.7
(Export of cotton)	67.1	71.5	56.8	52.0	34.9	60.6	96.3
Import of goods [2]	-163.4	-64.1	-55.3	-81.2	-81.7	-99.1	-128.3
Merchandise trade balance	-64.4	24.2	15.7	2.2	-24.0	-20.9	-18.6
Other goods, services, income (including shipping) net	-87.1	-58.4	-27.5	-22.3	-18.8	-52.4	-60.4
Private transfers	-11.4	-9.3	-4.1	-0.6	-0.7	-2.8	-1.7
Official transfers, (including development grants, emergency relief, budget subsidies, military grants)	116.6	35.2	24.5	41.1	61.9	114.1	87.6
Current account balance	-46.3	-8.3	8.6	20.4	18.4	38.0	6.9
Capital account							
Long-term capital	36.8	-3.9	-4.2	-2.1	-1.2	-17.8	4.7
(Direct investment)	35.2	-1.3	-0.4	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	9.2
Short-term capital	-3.3	-0.3	0.0	0.0	1.2	-3.8	-9.5
Counterpart items (including valuation changes in reserves)	0.7	2.3	2.0	2.6	3.2	-1.7	-0.2
Exceptional financing (including overdrafts with French Treasury, Stabex grants, etc.)	19.8	27.5	18.7	-16.4	-2.0	10.0	8.8
Errors and omissions	-12.8	-17.3	-28.1	-3.5	-14.0	-8.6	8.6
Total capital account	41.2	8.3	-11.6	-19.4	-12.8	-21.9	12.4
Total changes in reserves [3]	5.3	-0.1	3.1	-0.9	-5.5	-16.0	-19.2

[1] Converted from International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights.
[2] Free on board.
[3] Because of rounding, total changes in reserves plus total capital account may not equal current account balance.

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, 36, Pt. 1, Washington, 1985, 122–25.

Table 7. External Debt, 1980–85
(in millions of United States dollars)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Long-term	191.8	173.9	144.7	148.1	140.0	149.6
Short-term	5.0	5.0	5.0	3.0	1.0	3.0
International Monetary Fund credit	6.9	8.3	7.8	7.4	4.4	8.7
TOTAL	203.7	187.2	157.5	158.5	145.4	161.3

Table 8. Major Equipment of Chadian National Armed Forces, 1987

Type	In Inventory *	Country of Manufacture
Armored vehicles		
Panhard ERC-90 armored cars with 90mm gun	4	France
AML-90 light armored cars, some with 90mm gun	50	-do-
AML-20 light armored cars	6	-do-
V-150 Cadillac Gage armored cars with 90mm gun	8	United States
Artillery		
M-101 105mm howitzers	5	-do-
60mm, 82mm, 106mm mortars	n.a.	n.a.
Antitank weapons		
Rocket launchers 68mm, 89mm	n.a.	n.a.
106mm recoilless rifles	n.a.	United States
112mm APILAS recoilless rifles	n.a.	France
Milan wire-guided missiles	50	-do-
LAW M-72 launchers	n.a.	United States
Air defense weapons		
20mm, 30mm guns	n.a.	France
Redeye, Stinger shoulder-fired missiles	n.a.	United States
SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles	n.a.	Soviet Union
All-terrain vehicles		
Toyota 4 x 4; AM General 4 x 4; Sovamag TC-10	400	Japan, United States, and France
Trucks		
2½ ton cargo	n.a.	France and United States

n.a.—not available.
* Estimated.

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1987–1988,* London, 1987,124.

Table 9. Major Equipment Items Captured from Libya, 1987

Type	Number	Country of Manufacture
Armored vehicles		
T-54 tanks	3	Soviet Union
T-55 tanks	113	-do-
T-62 tanks	12	-do-
Tank transporters	10	-do-
Cascavel armored cars	8	Brazil
AML-90 armored vehicles	4	France
BMP personnel carriers	146	Soviet Union
BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles	10	-do-
BTR personnel carriers	10	-do-
Weapons systems		
14.5mm heavy machine guns	50	-do-
23mm air defense guns	16	-do-
106mm recoilless rifles	60	n.a.
107mm recoilless rifles	4	n.a.
122mm field howitzers	22	n.a.
SA-6 batteries (tracked missile launcher accompanied by radar on tracked carriage)	12	Soviet Union
SA-13 batteries (launcher and radar on tracked carriage)	4	-do-
Vehicles		
Toyota all-terrain mounted with 14.5mm guns	60	Japan and Soviet Union
Toyota troop transporters	194	Japan
Jeeps mounted with 106mm recoilless rifles	30	United States
Land Rovers	24	Britain
Mercedes heavy transport trucks	228	West Germany
Mercedes repair vehicles	12	-do-
Mercedes tank trucks	43	-do-
Aircraft		
L-39 Albatros jet trainers	11	Czechoslovakia
SF-260 Marchetti light trainers	9	Italy
Mi-24 helicopters	3	Soviet Union

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from Chad, *Kadafi/Tchad: Ingérence, agression, occupation: Livre blanc*, N'Djamena, Chad, 1987, 109-10.

Table 10. Major Air Force Equipment, 1987

Type	In Inventory *	Country of Manufacture
C-130 Hercules transport	2	United States
C-47 transport	3	-do-
DC-4 transport	1	-do-
CASA 212 Aviocar transport	1	Spain
Pilatus PC-7 trainer	2	Switzerland
SF-260 Marchetti trainer	n.a.	Italy

n.a.—not available.
* Estimated.

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1987-1988,* London, 1987, 124.

Appendix B

Principal Armed Factions, 1975–87

ANL—see National Liberation Army.

Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN)—Composed of FROLINAT (*q.v.*) units that remained loyal to Habré following his break from Goukouni Oueddei in 1976. Consisting at first of only a few hundred Toubou and some Hajerai and Ouaddaïan fighters, FAN began its operations from bases in eastern Chad, where it received help from Sudan. Driven from N'Djamena back to its eastern refuge after the Libyan incursion of 1980, FAN scored a series of victories over Goukouni's GUNT (*q.v.*) forces in 1982, which culminated in the recapture of N'Djamena and Habré's assumption of the presidency. FAN became the core of the new national army, FANT (*q.v.*), in January 1983.

CCFAN—see Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT.

CDR—see Democratic Revolutionary Council.

Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Tchadiennes—FAT)—The army of the central government of President Félix Malloum until his downfall in 1979, when the head of the gendarmerie, Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué, assumed command. Joined by gendarmerie units, FAT became a regional force representing primarily the Sara ethnic group of the five southern prefectures. It joined with GUNT (*q.v.*) forces fighting against Hissein Habré and was a recipient of aid from Libya. FAT began to disintegrate during 1982 as a result of defeats inflicted by Habré's FAN (*q.v.*). Most remaining soldiers accepted integration into FAN or resumed their insurgency as *codos*.

Chadian National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes—FANT)—The army of the central government since January 1983, when pro-Habré forces were merged. Consisting of about 10,000 soldiers at that time, it swelled with the assimilation of former FAT (*q.v.*) and *codos* rebels from the south and, in 1986, with the addition of GUNT (*q.v.*) soldiers who had turned against their Libyan allies. Freshly outfitted by France and the United States, FANT drove Libyan troops from their bases in northern Chad in a series of victories in 1987.

codos—see commandos.

commandos (*codos*)—Southern guerrilla groups, active from 1983 to 1986, that resisted domination of their region by Habré's army.

Many were veterans of the government army of the 1970s or Kamougué's FAT (*q.v.*). Totaling as many as 15,000, they operated independently under such names as "Red Codos," "Thunder Red Codos," "Coconut Palms," "Hope," and "Green Eagles." The Red Codos under Colonel Alphonse Kotiga were the most effective. Kotiga exercised some influence over the other groups and was instrumental in persuading them to abandon their insurgency by promises of rewards and rehabilitation. About 1,500 had been assimilated into FANT (*q.v.*) as of 1986.

Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire—CDR)—Members were Chadians of Arab origin, most originating in Ouaddaï Prefecture or Batha Prefecture, with close ties to Libya and receptive to some of the ideological precepts of Muammar al Qadhafi. After the death of its founder, Acyl Ahmat, the CDR was headed by Acheikh ibn Oumar. The most pro-Libyan faction in GUNT (*q.v.*), it fought to prevent the defection of FAP (*q.v.*) units from Libya in 1986. Believed to number up to 3,000 at its peak in the early 1980s, the CDR dwindled to fewer than 1,000 adherents before it was battered by FANT (*q.v.*) attacks in 1987.

FAN—see Armed Forces of the North.

FANT—see Chadian National Armed Forces.

FAO—see Western Armed Forces.

FAP—see People's Armed Forces.

FAT—see Chadian Armed Forces.

First Liberation Army of FROLINAT—Operated in eastern Chad as one of the original armies of the FROLINAT insurgency under General Mohamed Baghlani. After Baghlani's death in 1977, its personnel gravitated to the First Volcan Army of Adoum Dana or Acyl Ahmat's New Volcan (see Volcan Forces). The First Liberation Army reemerged under Mahamat Abba Said in 1984, joining the GUNT (*q.v.*) coalition against Habré, but was one of the factions disapproving dependence on Libya.

FROLINAT—see National Liberation Front of Chad.

GUNT—see Transitional Government of National Unity.

MPLT—see Third Liberation Army of FROLINAT.

National Liberation Army (Armée Nationale de Libération—ANL)—The military wing of the GUNT coalition under Goukouni that had been formally constituted in October 1982 (see Transitional Government of National Unity).

National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad—FROLINAT)—See First Liberation Army of FROLINAT, Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT, and Third Liberation Army of FROLINAT.

People's Armed Forces (Forces Armées Populaires—FAP)—Composed of followers of Goukouni after the schism with Habré in 1976. With an ethnic base in the Teda clan of the Toubou from the Tibesti area of northern Chad, the force was armed by Libya and formed the largest component of the GUNT (*q.v.*) coalition army opposing Habré's rule. FAP troops rebelled against their Libyan allies in the latter part of 1986. Many of them were subsequently integrated into the national army, FANT (*q.v.*), and participated in the 1987 attempt to drive Libya out of Chadian territory.

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad (Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad—MPLT)—see Western Armed Forces.

Second Liberation Army of FROLINAT—One of the original groups in rebellion against the regime of François Tombalbaye. The Second Liberation Army was composed of the Toubou active in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, first under Goukouni's command and later under Habré's command. Renamed the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commandement des Forces Armées du Nord—CCFAN), it was in a bitter struggle with the First Liberation Army in the early 1970s. After the rift between Habré and Goukouni in 1976, Habré's followers adopted the name of Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN), and Goukouni's followers adopted the name of People's Armed Forces (Forces Armées Populaires—FAP).

Third Liberation Army of FROLINAT—A small group from among the Kanembu people of western Chad, the Third Liberation Army splintered off from FAP (*q.v.*) in 1977; initially headed by Aboubaker Abderrahmane, it later became known as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad (Movement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad—MPLT). In a subsequent split, part of the MPLT became the Western Armed Forces (*q.v.*).

Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition—GUNT)—A coalition of factions occupying the north with the aid of Libya, GUNT formed the principal opposition to Habré after 1981. Its component factions (*q.v.*) included initially FAP, FAT, the CDR, the FAO, and Volcan Forces. The National Liberation Army (Armée Nationale de Libération—ANL) was formally constituted as the military arm of GUNT in October 1982. Although Goukouni served as commander in chief, the various GUNT military factions remained as distinct units under their individual commanders. In general usage, the term GUNT continued to be used to refer

to the northern rebel army. After Goukouni's FAP mutinied against Libyan domination in 1986 and Goukouni was removed as head of GUNT, the remaining GUNT contingents under the CDR's Acheikh ibn Oumar were sometimes referred to as "Neo-GUNT" or "GUNT/CDR."

Volcan Forces—The First Liberation Army of FROLINAT (*q.v.*) split up in 1977 into two Volcan (volcano) armies. The First Volcan Army of Adoum Dana was an ethnic Arab force receiving support from Sudan. It was absorbed into GUNT (*q.v.*) in 1981 and fought against Habré. New Volcan, the predecessor of the CDR (*q.v.*), was commanded by Acyl Ahmat, a protégé of Libya. Acyl aligned his followers with Goukouni against Habré in 1979. Although initially among the smallest elements (400 to 500 men), New Volcan constituted a corps of shock troops who were among the most resolute fighters in GUNT.

Western Armed Forces (Forces Armées Occidentales—FAO)—An offshoot of the MPLT (*q.v.*), the FAO recruited its forces mainly among the Kanembu group located along the shores of Lake Chad and enjoyed support from some political elements in Nigeria. Initially part of GUNT (*q.v.*), the FAO had reportedly divided into pro- and anti-Goukouni factions. Its leader, Moussa Medela, rejected Acheikh ibn Oumar as head of GUNT after Goukouni was deposed at the close of 1986.

* * *

Additional background on the rivalry between the numerous armed factions in Chad during the 1970s and early 1980s can be found in Virginia M. Thompson and Richard Adloff's *Conflict in Chad* and in *Why Chad?,* a monograph by Alex Rondos in the *CSIS Africa Notes* series. Each of the groups, together with its antecedents, is briefly sketched in *Peut-on encore sauver le Tchad?* by Michel N'Gangbet. Samuel Decalo also provides sketches of most factions in *Historical Dictionary of Chad.* (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

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Glossary

Aozou Strip—A disputed section of northern Chad, running the length of the border with Libya and extending south to a depth of about 100 kilometers into Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture. Libya based its claim to the area on an unratified 1935 treaty between France and Italy, the colonial powers of Chad and Libya, respectively. Libya occupied some areas of the strip beginning in 1972 and remained there as of 1988.

barrels per day (bpd)—Production of crude oil and petroleum products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A barrel is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons.

CFA franc—The African Financial Community (Communauté Financière Africaine) franc, the currency of the organization of former French colonies, often referred to as the Franc Zone. The CFA franc was guaranteed by the French treasury and pegged to the French franc, into which it was freely convertible. In December 1988 the exchange rate was CFA F298 to US$1.

French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française—AEF)—The former colonial federation of areas that later became the independent states of Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic, and Congo. A history of French rule and missionary involvement forged organizational ties connecting these areas. The AEF was dissolved in 1958, but upon gaining independence in 1960, Chad joined former AEF members in a multilateral military assistance agreement with France.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word *gross* indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. *See also gross national product.*

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (*q.v.*) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies.

Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

Lomé Convention—The first Lomé Convention (Lomé I) came into force in 1976, Lomé II came into effect in 1981, and Lomé III came into force in 1986. The convention covers economic relations between the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). The convention allows most ACP exports to enter the EEC duty-free or at special rates and, among other things, provides funds through the Stabex system (*q.v.*) to offset adverse fluctuations in the prices of ACP exports.

polders—Areas of low-lying land reclaimed from a sea, lake, or river by the protection of dikes. In Chad polders have been created along the southeastern shores of Lake Chad and are used for the production of wheat and corn.

Sahel—The subarid climatological zone located south of the Sahara Desert that stretches from east to west across Africa. In Chad the Sahel, also called the *sahelian* zone, forms roughly the central third of the country and supports subsistence farming and livestock raising.

Stabex system—A system of export earnings stabilization set up by the European Community (EC) in accordance with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. Under the system, the EC helps developing countries withstand fluctuations in the price of their agricultural products by paying compensation for lost export earnings.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose providing loans to developing countries for

productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less-developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

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